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Abstract 
 
We explore what happens to domestic firm-level ratings around the time of a sovereign-rating 
action on a day-by-day and country-by-country basis. Our granular approach provides banks and 
investors with a fuller picture of their sovereign credit risk exposure and, as such, our analysis 
might feed into banks’ internal modelling of their credit risk exposure for the purpose of 
determining regulatory capital, introduced under Basel II. We also provide a novel analysis of any 
bias in spill-over and we show that, inter alia, the tendency for greater spill-over of negative 
sovereign-rating actions can largely be accounted for by firm- and sovereign-level factors. 
However, even after allowing for these factors, some countries suffer from negative bias. The 
implied higher correlation between sovereign and firm-level ratings in times when countries are in 
crisis versus when they are in recovery may contribute to quicker and/or deeper crises versus 
slower and/or longer recoveries.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we provide new findings on the spill-over of Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
sovereign credit ratings into the credit ratings of domestic firms, employing a sample of 34 
countries. Credit ratings are important in determining access to debt markets (e.g. Williams, 
Alsakka & Ap Gwilym, 2013). Where sovereign ratings spill over into the ratings of domestic 
corporations, this will have an immediate and direct impact on the cost of firm-level borrowing 
(Hand, Holthausen & Leftwich, 1992; Augustin, Boustanifar, Breckenfelder &Schnitzler, 2016). 
 Our analysis offers two key contributions. First, we explore what happens to domestic 
firm-level ratings for each country in our sample around the time of a sovereign-rating action on a 
day-by-day basis. Our more granular approach is particularly useful for those wanting information 
on the extent and timing of spill-over of the sovereign rating into firm-level ratings on a country-
by-country basis. Second, we add to the literature by providing a novel analysis of any possible 
bias in the spill-over of sovereign ratings to domestic firms.  
Our results are useful to banks in determining their exposure to sovereign credit risk. If a 
bank has lent heavily to companies within a particular sovereign, our results provide a country-
specific picture of the likelihood of transmission of sovereign credit risk to company credit 
ratings, allowing the bank a fuller picture of its sovereign credit risk exposure. As such, our 
analysis might feed into banks’ internal modelling of their credit risk exposure for the purpose of 
determining regulatory capital, introduced under Basel II. Our analysis is equally useful to 
investors to enable them to determine the likely spill-over of sovereign credit risk into their 
investments in different countries.  
 Our analysis of bias is directed at regulatory bodies and government finance ministers. 
They should understand and appreciate the extent to which there is evidence that the impact of 
positive and negative sovereign-rating actions on domestic companies has been unequal and may 
therefore continue to be so, both before and after accounting for factors which we expect to 
determine the extent of spill-over. The implied higher correlation between sovereign and firm-
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level ratings in times when countries are in crisis versus when they are in recovery could 
contribute to quicker and/or deeper crises versus slower and/or longer recoveries.  
 We show that firm-level rating changes in the days and hours up to the sovereign 
change are few across all countries in our sample but this picture changes within an hour of the 
sovereign change. Our focus on the short term contrasts with prior studies
1
 and improves our 
ability to claim causality running from the sovereign-rating action to the ratings of domestic firms. 
In addition, our examination of sovereign spill-over on a day-by-day basis provides additional 
information about the timing of sovereign spill-over.  
A large literature exists on the spill-over of sovereign ratings across multiple dimensions, 
and in Section 2 we explain how our study fits into this wider literature. Most closely related to 
our paper are the studies which examine sovereign-corporate rating inter-dependence (Ferri, Liu 
& Majnoni, 2001; Williams et al. 2013; Borensztein, Cowan & Valenzuela, 2013; Almeida, 
Cunha, Ferreira & Restrepo, 2017).     
Before allowing for firm and sovereign characteristics we find that negative spill-over 
tends to be higher than positive spill-over, a result reported by Ferri et al. (2001). However, our 
country-by-country results show that this is not the case for all countries. For example, in the 
month following a positive sovereign action, 74.1% of Argentinean (South African) rated firms 
also undergo a positive rating action, against 59.0% (33.3%) of firms undergoing a negative action 
in the month following a negative sovereign action. We also find that, in aggregate, unconditional 
spill-over to firms domiciled in NHICs tends to be higher than to firms domiciled in higher 
income countries (HICs) (as reported by Ferri et al. 2001). However, our country-by-country 
focus demonstrates that there is considerable heterogeneity in sovereign spill-over within both 
HIC and NHIC status countries. Thus, for example, the (unconditional) probability of negative 
sovereign spill-over within one month of the sovereign action is 81.5% for Brazil, an NHIC with 
average GDP per capita across our sample period of 4,943 USD; and contrasts with 36.5% for 
Indonesia, an NHIC with an average GDP per capita across our sample period of 1,249 USD and 
                                                          
1
 Prior studies examine the link between corporate and sovereign changes on a yearly (e.g. Ferri et al. 2001; 
Borensztein et al. 2013), quarterly (e.g. Williams et al. 2013) or monthly (e.g. Almeida et al. 2016) basis. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
4 
 
with 38.8% for France, an HIC with an average GDP per capita across our sample period of 
34,323 USD. As stated above, this country-by-country analysis is useful for those wanting to 
know their exposure to the spill-over of sovereign credit risk for a particular country. 
We examine bias in spill-over after allowing for firm characteristics and sovereign 
conditions, which we term ‘conditional bias’. We find that, ceteris paribus, total conditional spill-
over (i.e. both positive and negative) is higher for NHICs, a finding which supports the earlier 
concerns of Ferri et al. (2001) that the reliance on external ratings for the calculation of banks’ 
capital asset requirements is likely to be detrimental to banks in NHICs.  
Ex ante, we suggest that negative bias might arise where S&P allocates more resources to 
discovering deteriorations in credit quality to protect its reputation (Ederington & Goh (1998)) or 
for countries which face a realistic prospect of default, when unfavourable government actions 
would have consequences for domestic firms (Borensztein et al. 2013). However, we find no 
evidence that conditional negative bias is universal or higher in lower-rated countries. For most 
countries, any negative-positive bias is captured by the variables which represent firm 
characteristics and changes in the sovereign environment. These findings contrast with prior 
literature. Williams et al. (2013) examine the impact of changes in emerging market sovereign 
ratings on the ratings of banks domiciled within these markets and find that positive sovereign 
actions have a greater impact than negative actions. Borensztein et al. (2013) find that, in 
aggregate, negative sovereign actions have a greater impact on domestic firms than positive 
sovereign actions. We suggest that our findings differ from these studies as a result of differences 
in sample and/or methodological approach. Thus, we extend the analysis of Williams et al. (2013) 
to additionally incorporate developed markets and all of the industrial sectors of S&P-rated firms. 
The analysis of Borensztein et al. (2013) examines the impact of changes in the sovereign rating 
on domestic firm ratings on an annual basis with no evident reference to the relative timing of 
sovereign- and firm-level actions.
2
 We ensure that sovereign actions precede firm-level actions in 
all cases. We also adopt a shorter-term focus than in either paper, for the reasons we set out above. 
                                                          
2
 It is problematic, for example, to suggest that a firm action at the beginning of the year is related to a sovereign 
action at the end of the same calendar year 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
5 
 
Again, our country-by-country analysis of bias provides novel results. We find evidence of 
persistent negative spill-over bias for Spain, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Colombia and Brazil. We 
find some evidence of persistent positive spill-over bias for Argentina. The findings of positive or 
negative bias are anomalous in that our theoretical justifications for such bias are not borne out by 
the empirical analysis. We suggest that the governments and regulatory authorities of the 
countries concerned may want to seek an explanation for the cause of such bias from S&P.  
Our focus is the country specific. However, we also add to the literature by identifying the 
common determinants of sovereign spill-over across countries. We find that the pre-existing 
stock-market volatility and the current credit rating of the firm relative to the sovereign determine 
the probability of sovereign spill-over to a domestic firm. We separate firms which are rated at 
parity with the sovereign rating from those rated above the sovereign rating, which have been 
considered equally ‘bound’ by the sovereign rating in prior studies (Borensztein et al. 2013; 
Almeida et al. 2017). We find that firms rated above the sovereign are relatively more immune 
from domestic sovereign credit risk than those rated at parity with the sovereign. We also find that 
the odds of spill-over to a firm rated at parity with the sovereign are higher for investment-grade 
sovereigns than for sub-investment grade sovereigns, which suggests that the coupling of firm and 
sovereign ratings for firms at parity with the sovereign rating occurs when the sovereign rating is 
still some way from default. This leads us to query the suggestion of Borensztein et al. (2013), 
that the primary reason for the continued operation of a de facto sovereign ceiling (by which the 
rating of a firm cannot exceed the credit rating of the sovereign in which the firm is domiciled) is 
the likely implementation of capital controls in the event of a sovereign moving close to default. 
Finally, we stress that our analysis does not in any way address the validity of sovereign 
ratings, it is simply an assessment of the relationship between sovereign-rating actions and 
subsequent changes to the ratings of firms located within that country. We acknowledge that a 
number of papers challenge the reliability of the sovereign ratings produced by the credit rating 
agencies (see, e.g., Ferri et al. 2001; Guegan, Hassani & Zhao, 2013; and the many press articles 
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of Paul Krugman
3
). This does not prevent our analysis from providing a useful input into banks’ 
internal ratings based systems to determine the likely exposure of firms domiciled within a 
country to that country’s sovereign-rating actions.  
 The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methods we employ. Section 4 contains the results of 
the link between sovereign and corporate rating changes on a country-by-country basis. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature and Hypotheses 
A large literature exists on the spill-over of sovereign ratings across multiple dimensions 
and we explain in this section how our study fits into this wider literature. For an alternative 
discussion of the spill-over of sovereign credit risk along a number of dimensions see Tran, 
Alsakka and Ap Gwilym (2014). 
A number of papers examine the spill-over of sovereign-rating actions undertaken by the 
rating agencies into returns on assets in the stock, bond and credit default swap (CDS) markets. 
Brooks, Faff, Hillier and Hillier (2004), Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) and Hill and Faff (2010) 
examine the spill-over of sovereign-rating changes into the returns on domestic assets, while other 
papers focus on contagion across markets by examining the spill-over of sovereign-rating changes 
in one country into the returns on assets in foreign markets (Gande & Parsley, 2005; Ferreira & 
Gama, 2007; Ismailescu & Kazemi, 2010; Arezki , Candelon & Sy, 2011; Afonso , Furceri & 
Gomes, 2012; Böninghausen & Zabel, 2015). Whether examining spill-over into domestic or 
foreign asset returns, these analyses focus on the spill-over of sovereign rating agency actions into 
asset returns at the aggregate level.  
Closer to our analysis are papers which examine the spill-over of sovereign credit risk into 
individual firms. Augustin et al. (2016) examine the relationship between sovereign and corporate 
                                                          
3
 For example, see the blog of Paul Krugman at http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/ratings-disaster/?_r=1. 
In this article Krugman also cites Jonathan Portes ‘when it comes to assessing sovereign debt ‘credit risk’ [the credit 
rating agencies] … do not know what they are talking about.’  
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CDS spreads in the wake of the first Greek bailout on 11 April 2010 via a sample of 226 firms 
across 15 European countries. They provide evidence of increased interdependence of sovereign 
and corporate CDS spreads in the period following the bailout. Other recent papers also report a 
link between sovereign and corporate CDS spreads (Bai and Wei, 2012; Bedendo and Colla, 
2013). Acharya , Drechsler and Schnabl (2014) explore the impact of sovereign credit risk on a 
sample of European firms via their exposure to GIIPS banks (i.e. those incorporated in Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), which are assumed to be more severely impacted by the credit 
crisis. They find that firms with higher exposure to GIIPS banks are credit constrained and have 
lower levels of investment, sales and employment growth relative to firms with lower exposure.  
Most closely related to our work are the studies which examine sovereign-corporate rating inter-
dependence (Ferri et al. 2001; Williams et al. 2013; Borensztein et al. 2013; Almeida et al. 2017), 
and the marginal contributions of our paper to this literature are discussed in the Introduction.  
 The unique contributions of our analyses stem in part from our access to the entire 
history (1923 et seq.) of sovereign and corporate ratings produced by S&P. We track all rated 
firms across our sample period, including those which have not undergone any changes to their 
rating since the initial rating. Access to full rating histories for all rated firms allows us to build a 
more complete picture of the impact of sovereign credit rating actions on the credit ratings of 
domestic firms.
4
 The timings of rating actions (available since 1996) allow us to confirm the 
relative timing of changes to the sovereign- and firm-level ratings when they occur on the same 
day, and we therefore ensure that sovereign actions precede firm-level actions in all cases.  
A S&P publication dated 7 December 2011 clearly indicates the link between their 
sovereign- and firm-level ratings:  
today [7 December 2011] ... [S&P] has placed its ratings on some of the largest 
rated banking groups in the Eurozone on CreditWatch with negative implications 
... This follows the placement of the sovereign credit ratings ... on CreditWatch 
with negative implications on Dec. 5, 2011 ... We intend to resolve the 
CreditWatch placement on these banks soon after the resolution of the 
CreditWatch placement on the related sovereign.
5
  
                                                          
4
 Databases used in most prior research cover only rating changes, so firms which are rated but do not have a rating 
change during the period of analysis are omitted. 
5
 ‘Standard and Poor’s Places Several Large Bank Groups Across The Eurozone on CreditWatch Negative’, 7 
December 2011, S&P. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
8 
 
 
 We formulate four hypotheses in relation to our analysis, described in the following 
paragraphs. 
Evidence that sovereign-rating actions impact firm-level rating actions is strengthened 
where a limited number firm-level actions occur in the pre-sovereign-rating action window, and a 
much larger number of actions occur in the post-sovereign-rating action window. Our first 
hypothesis is: 
 
H1: Since sovereign-rating actions have a direct impact on firm-level rating actions there is a 
large increase in the number of domestic firm rating actions from the pre to the post sovereign-
rating action period.   
 
 To address H1, we provide a detailed examination of unconditional sovereign spill-over 
for each of our sample countries, where we employ the term ‘unconditional’ to describe sovereign 
spill-over prior to allowing for firm and sovereign characteristics which determine spill-over.  
 Our remaining hypotheses address bias in spill-overs. Where negative sovereign-rating 
actions have a stronger impact than positive rating actions (i.e. negative bias exists), this may 
contribute to quicker and/or deeper crises versus slower and/or longer recoveries. We determine, 
on a country-by-country basis, the impact of positive and negative sovereign-rating changes both 
before and after controlling for sovereign- and firm-level factors which determine spill-over. We 
term any bias after controlling for sovereign- and firm-level determinants of spill-over 
‘conditional’ bias. Where conditional negative bias exists, it may indicate inequity in firm re-
ratings as a result of a sovereign re-rating.   
Conditional negative bias across all countries might arise since rating agency reputation 
relies on the timely identification of credit problems associated with negative changes to the 
rating, with more resources allocated by the rating agencies to discovering deteriorations in credit 
quality (Ederington & Goh, 1998). If this is the case then rating agencies are likely to expend 
more effort investigating firm-level credit ratings in the wake of negative sovereign-rating actions, 
which would affect the relative impact of positive and negative sovereign actions. Equally, if the 
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damage to rating agency reputations applies primarily to firms awarded ratings which turn out to 
be too high, ‘blanket’ firm-level rating changes are more likely for negative sovereign actions, 
particularly in times associated with a large degree of uncertainty. This leads to our second 
hypothesis:  
 
H2: Rating agency reputation relies on the timely identification of credit problems associated with 
negative changes to ratings, and this is reflected in conditional negative spill-over bias across all 
countries. 
 
Negative bias might apply particularly to countries with a realistic prospects of default; as 
sovereigns approach default, so the likelihood increases that the country will implement policies 
which in turn will impact the ability of firms domiciled within the country to repay their foreign 
currency debts (see, e.g., Durbin & Ng, 2005). A negative bias arises from the increased 
probability of government action which would adversely impact the corporate sector. This leads to 
our third hypothesis:  
 
H3: The extent of sovereign spill-over is affected by adverse government actions when countries 
face default. Negative bias is greater for the sub-set of countries with a realistic prospect of 
default. 
 
 
We argue that the theoretical arguments for conditional negative bias outweigh those for 
conditional positive bias and, therefore, we anticipate conditional negative rather than conditional 
positive bias. However, conditional positive bias in sovereign spill-over might arise from the 
relative timings of sovereign upgrades and downgrades. Kim and Nabar (2007) show that the 
rating agencies wait longer to implement upgrades and, therefore, when a positive sovereign 
change does occur the rating agencies are confident that a recovery is under way and may 
therefore be willing to upgrade a greater proportion of firms.  
Borensztein et al. (2013) argue that the primary reason for the operation of a sovereign 
ceiling is the likely implementation of capital controls in the event of a sovereign moving close to 
default. This is related to H3 above. However, we separately examine the operation of the 
sovereign ceiling via a fourth hypothesis. 
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H4: Spill-over to firms rated at or above the sovereign ceiling is particularly acute for the 
negative actions of sovereigns which are closer to default.  
 
We do not formulate a hypothesis to address the relative total (i.e. positive and negative) 
spill-over of sovereign rating actions to NHICs versus HICs. However, we undertake this analysis 
after allowing for firm and sovereign characteristics to allow for comparison with the 
‘unconditional’ results of Ferri et al. (2001).  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3. 1 Sample 
Our sample consists of the universe of S&P-rated firms across 34 countries for the period 
June 1996 through to the close of May 2012. Full rating histories for all rated firms are required to 
reliably assess the impact of sovereign credit rating spill-over to the credit ratings of domestic 
firms.
6
 The precise timings of rating actions are also required to allow us to analyse the relative 
timing of changes to the sovereign- and firm-level ratings. These data are available from S&P’s 
Ratings Xpress, which provides a full rating history from 1923 and the precise timing of rating 
actions from 1996.  
 Rating agencies supply sovereign issuer ratings with respect to both foreign currency 
denominated and local currency denominated debt. Given that the local currency rating is more 
likely to act as a proxy for inflation risk rather than sovereign default risk, we focus our analysis 
on long-term foreign currency ratings. World Bank/IMF data show that for each country in our 
sample both firms and sovereigns issue foreign-currency denominated debt.
7
  
S&P’s Ratings Xpress provides ratings for the following sub-sectors: Asset-Backed 
Securities, Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities, Corporations, Financial Institutions, 
International Public Finance, Insurance, Real Estate Companies, Residential Mortgage-Backed 
Securities, Servicer Evaluations, Sovereigns, Utilities. We define all firm-level ratings as those 
                                                          
6
 As stated in the Introduction, databases used in most prior research cover only rating changes and, thus, firms which 
are rated but do not have a rating change during the period of analysis are omitted. 
7
 We provide a table showing the data, which is available online (Supplementary Table S1). 
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belonging to the following sub-sectors: Corporations, Financial Institutions, Insurance, Utilities. 
All Real Estate Companies (RECs) are also classified as Corporations and we therefore include 
RECs under ‘Corporations’. Owing to S&P’s specific use of the word ‘Corporations’, we label all 
non-sovereign issuers in our sample as ‘firm-level’ issuers. 
To qualify for our analysis there must be an adequate number of firm-level ratings, which 
we define as a minimum of 20 firms with issuer ratings domiciled in a given country at one point 
during our sample period. We exclude all countries where S&P did not amend the sovereign 
issuer foreign currency credit rating or outlook at least once during our sample period.
8
 This 
filtering process leaves us with 34 ‘countries’: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the UK and the 
USA.  
We obtain details of the rating value and outlook (including credit watch status) for all 
firms and sovereigns rated at the beginning of our sample period, 31 May 1996, and thereafter we 
track all changes in long-term issuer ratings and outlooks. Thus, for example, for Germany we 
start by tracking the 21 firms rated at 31 May 1996 and add each newly rated firm until by the 
close of our sample period we are tracking 1,291 rated firms. All actions are classified into 
negative and positive actions. When tracking actions we assume that only actions which follow 
the direction of the sovereign action are related to the sovereign change.
9
 Throughout our analyses 
the data are dynamic, in the sense that we track what happens to firm ratings across our sample on 
a day-by-day basis and in particular what happens to domestic firm ratings in the wake of a 
sovereign-rating action (we employ second by second data on the sovereign action day to identify 
which firm-level actions precede and which follow the sovereign action).  
                                                          
8
 S&P did not amend the sovereign issuer foreign currency credit rating or outlook at least once during our sample 
period in the case of Norway, Singapore and Switzerland. S&P do not issue a sovereign rating for the Cayman 
Islands. We lack sovereign-level data for Bermuda. 
9
 The following rating actions are excluded from our analysis: the first rating, withdrawn ratings, the first rating 
following a withdrawn rating, the first rating following a default, rating changes between categories of default, 
outlook changes to and from developing status. As would be expected, firm-level changes tend to be in the same 
direction as the sovereign change. Any changes to the outlook status which occur at the same time as a rating change 
are assumed to be dominated by the rating change. 
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In Table 1 we present basic statistics for sovereign- and firm-level ratings across our 
sample countries. Columns 2 and 3 indicate the dates at which firms and sovereigns were first 
rated, and Columns 4 through 6 provide firm and sovereign-rating details at the end of our sample 
period (May 2012). Column 4 shows the number of firms rated, and Columns 5 and 6 the average 
firm and sovereign rating at 31 May 2012. All of these data are static in the sense that they relate 
to a point in time. 
In Columns 7 through 12 the data are dynamic in the sense that they relate to actions 
across our sample period. Column 7 details the total number of sovereign actions (total = 313) and 
Column 8 details the number of positive (vs negative) actions across our sample period. Positive 
actions are rating upgrades or positive credit watch or outlook changes, and negative actions are 
rating downgrades or negative credit watch or outlook changes. Over the sample period the 
following countries had only positive (negative) sovereign actions: Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Denmark, Sweden (Austria, France, the USA). Thus 31 (29) countries undergo positive (negative) 
sovereign actions. Turkey experienced the most sovereign actions at 29, 52% of which were 
positive, followed by Indonesia (25, 44% positive) and Argentina (20, 30% positive).  
The sample firms underwent a total of 51,709 changes to their rating in the sample period 
(Column 9). For our subsequent analyses we employ data for all firms rated at the time of each of 
the sovereign-rating actions. Across the eligible sample of 34 countries, 20,407 domestic firms 
(Column 11) hold a rating at the start of each of the 313 days (Column 7) when the sovereign 
rating is changed in the period June 1996 through to the close of May 2012. 6,574 firms contribute 
the 20,407 firm ratings (Column 12).  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 
 The analysis requires that both sovereign- and firm-level ratings exist for a particular 
country. As such, any firm-level actions which occur when the sovereign is in default are 
excluded from the analysis (sovereign-rating withdrawals do not affect our sample sovereigns). 
There are five sovereign defaults in our sample which affect Argentina, Greece and Indonesia. We 
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find that, unlike other negative rating actions for these countries, there are no immediate firm-
level rating changes in response to defaults. This is not surprising given that the rating agencies 
have control over the timing of their rating actions but they have no control over the timing of 
defaults; as such we find that revisions to firm-level ratings tend to precede sovereign defaults and 
are in response to previous rating revisions. We undertake a separate analysis of firm-level actions 
around sovereign defaults in Section 5.2. 
 Data availability for Taiwan and Luxembourg reduces the sample for the regression 
analysis of spill-over to 20,132 firms across 32 countries. For the analysis of bias, we require that 
both sovereigns and firms undergo both positive and negative rating actions. This further reduces 
the number of sovereigns and firm ratings available; we undertake analyses of spill-over across 
both the (0,3) window and the (0, 21) window, and the samples are 9,152 firm ratings across 18 
countries for the (0, 3) window and 10,608 firm ratings across 22 countries for the (0, 21) 
window.
10
  
 
3.2 Method and Variables 
 
To investigate sovereign spill-over we employ logit models, and our dependent variable, 
Firm-action, takes a value of 1 if the firm experiences a rating change in the same direction as the 
sovereign change within three days of the sovereign-rating change, (0, +3), and 0 otherwise. We 
also report results for the (0, +21) window, which we employ to determine timing differences and 
persistent disparities between positive and negative actions.  
The scope of our sample is determined by the reach of S&P, and thus the data are not a 
random sample of all sovereigns but rather an enumeration of all countries with adequate 
firm-level rating coverage. We employ a model with sovereign fixed effects since we do not 
intend to extrapolate the results beyond our sample of sovereigns. Since the data are nested, 
we produce standard error estimates by clustering at the sovereign level – that is, the highest 
                                                          
10
 In Supplementary Table S2, available online, we provide a brief summary of the samples employed in the different 
tables and we set out details of differences in samples due to the availability of data and/or due to a lack of sovereign 
and/or firm rating actions.  
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level of aggregation at which the data might be correlated (see, e.g., Thompson, 2011). Since 
each firm can contribute more than one firm-rating observation to each sovereign, we employ 
robustness checks employing two-way clustering at both the firm and sovereign level, and we 
confirm that standard errors are only minimally affected by clustering at both the firm and 
sovereign level. In all cases we apply a finite sample adjustment to the standard errors.
11
  
The sovereign fixed effect accounts for all time invariant sovereign characteristics and 
we are unable to also employ time invariant sovereign variables. However, we do include 
sovereign variables which vary across time. These ‘within country’ effects are important 
controls given that sovereign actions occur at different points in time.  
Where it is useful to us to examine both the cross-sectional and time-varying effects of 
sovereign-level variables we support our fixed effects analysis with a random effects model, with 
firms nested within sovereign actions nested within sovereigns. We are aware of the criticisms of 
such an approach, where the number of groups (countries in our case) is limited (e.g. Bryan and 
Jenkins, 2013). However, we do not employ any cross-level interactions, which therefore reduces 
any bias (see Stegmueller, 2013).  
To identify the determinants of sovereign spill-over we employ firm and (time-varying) 
sovereign characteristics likely to impact sovereign spill-over. 
We follow both Borensztein et al. (2013) and Williams et al. (2012) by including the 
macroeconomic variables which drive sovereign ratings as set out by Cantor and Packer (1996) – 
that is, (the natural log of) per capita GDP, GDP growth, GDP growth volatility, the annual 
consumer price index (CPI) rate and the current account relative to GDP. We find that many 
countries with high current account deficits have a low level of sovereign spill-over (the USA, the 
UK, New Zealand); further, the annual CPI rate and GDP growth volatility fail to be significant in 
all preliminary analyses. We therefore select (the natural log of) per capita GDP and GDP growth 
                                                          
11
 We control for any effects which would induce correlation between observations drawn from the same time point. 
Sovereign actions can occur at any time and clustering by time amounts to clustering by sovereign action. Sovereign 
actions are nested within sovereigns and again the standard errors are only be minimally affected by clustering at the 
sovereign action in addition to the sovereign level.  
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from among these variables. Borensztein et al. (2013) argue that capital account restrictions drive 
the rating agencies’ sovereign ceiling policy, and to capture this we employ the capital account 
openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008) (KAOpen).  
The extent of the spill-over of sovereign credit ratings into domestic firm credit ratings is 
also likely to depend on the sovereign environment – that is, the credibility of the government to 
take action which favours the corporate sector, the extent of creditor protection within each 
market and the quality of the regulatory authorities. Faced with greater uncertainty or a lack of 
confidence in a particular market, we argue that the rating agencies are more likely to implement 
changes to firm-level ratings in response to a sovereign-rating change. The World Bank provides 
appropriate variables to capture most of these effects (Government effectiveness, Regulatory 
quality, Corruption, Rule of law).
12
  
We find that GDP per capita, KAOpen, Corruption, Government effectiveness, Regulatory 
quality and Rule of Law are highly correlated with cross-correlations exceeding 80%. To deal with 
the multicollinearity we first create a variable, ‘Environment’, by summing the World Bank 
indices, given that they are all measured on a scale of –2.5 to +2.5. We then undertake a principal 
components analysis and via one factor, which we term the ‘Wealth/Risk factor’, we capture 83% 
of the variance of these variables. The Wealth/Risk factor has similar weights on each component 
variable and a correlation with each of the component variables exceeding 90%. Where better 
suited to the question in hand, we employ the component variables (specifically, KAOpen is 
employed in our sovereign ceiling analysis). 
We add more immediate measures of macroeconomic circumstances – that is, stock 
market returns (Return) and volatility (StDev) – where returns represent the direction in which 
                                                          
12
 Government effectiveness measures ‘the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies’. Regulatory quality is a measure of ‘the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.’ 
Corruption measures ‘the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain’. Rule of law measures ‘the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence’. All measures run from –2.5 to +2.5. Incidentally, high levels of state ownership might also be expected to 
increase the dependency of firm default risk on sovereign default risk. However, a preliminary analysis at the 
aggregate level suggests a number of anomalies; for example, the state owned enterprise share of the market is low in 
Hong Kong and Mexico, relative to France and Belgium (see Kowalski, Buge, Sztajerowska and Egerland, 2013) and 
yet spill-over is higher for the former two. Firm-level state ownership data are not available across our sample. 
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economic conditions are changing and volatility measures the degree of uncertainty associated 
with a particular market. Volatility is higher during financial crises (e.g. Schwert 2011 and 1990), 
and therefore captures crisis conditions in which the rating agencies might be expected to hedge 
their risk by applying blanket firm-level rating adjustments in response to deteriorations in 
sovereign ratings. Negative stock market returns, stock market volatility and credit rating changes 
are associated with crises, and Ferri et al. (1999), inter alia, demonstrate that while sovereign-
rating changes further exacerbate crises, higher volatility emerges before any rating changes. We 
measure returns and volatility in the three months prior to the sovereign-rating change to capture 
conditions in the lead up to the sovereign change. These two variables have no cross-correlations 
with a magnitude exceeding 50%.  
We now turn to firm-level variables. If a company in our sample has been listed, observable 
owing to the assignment of a ticker symbol, we assume that information quality is greater owing 
to greater scrutiny. However Behr, Kisgen and Taillard (2014) argue that rating agencies are more 
likely to inflate the ratings of small firms rather than large firms, since large firms are more visible 
and the rating agencies will be conscious of any impact on their reputation of inaccuracies in the 
ratings of large firms. The same effect might operate for listed firms, with the rating agencies 
more likely to revise the ratings of more visible firms to protect their reputation, particularly in the 
wake of a sovereign downgrade.  
The propensity of firms to be affected by the sovereign rating might be affected by the firm’s 
own credit risk, as given by the firm credit rating. Our sample includes many unlisted entities with 
little or no available accounting or market data. However, a firm’s credit rating incorporates data 
on, inter alia, leverage and profitability (see, e.g., Blume, Lim & MacKinlay, 1998). We expect 
that firms with higher ratings are more likely to have access to resources (e.g. capital) which 
would allow them to better withstand a deterioration in sovereign conditions. However, firms with 
higher ratings are also more likely to have access to capital denominated in foreign currency and 
when the sovereign foreign currency credit rating is downgraded, firms with higher levels of 
foreign currency borrowing are more likely to be affected. The firm-rating variable also controls 
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for any re-rating owing to the credit risk of the firm as distinct from the firm rating being at or 
above the sovereign rating (see below). 
Independent from the impact of the firm’s own credit rating on spill-over, a firm’s likelihood 
of undergoing a rating change in the wake of a sovereign re-rating is also related to whether the 
firm is rated below, at or above the sovereign rating. If a sovereign ceiling is in operation, firms 
rated at and above the sovereign rating will be more likely to have their ratings revised in response 
to the sovereign-rating revision. Equal Sov. takes a value of 1 for firms with ratings which equal 
the home sovereign rating just prior to the sovereign action, and 0 otherwise. The variable denoted 
‘> Sov’ takes a value of 1 for a firm with a rating that exceeds the sovereign rating just prior to the 
sovereign action, and 0 otherwise. Where a firm has a rating of ‘AAA/Stable’, the firm rating 
cannot be amended upwards in response to a positive sovereign-rating change and these cases at 
the limit are excluded from the variables Equal Sov (1 case) and ‘> Sov’ (16 cases) for positive 
actions. The correlation between the firm rating and the dummy variables indicating a rating 
above or at parity with the sovereign rating is very low (< 3% in both cases). 
Our preliminary analysis suggests that financial firms in the Eurozone countries are 
particularly impacted by sovereign-rating changes, and Williams et al. (2013) provide evidence 
that bank rating changes in developing countries are significantly affected by sovereign-rating 
changes.
13
 Further, it is important that we control for the industrial breakdown of our sample of 
rated firms since this is likely to differ from that of all firms in the economies of the constituent 
sovereigns, given that financial firms are often rated first (Ferri et al. 2001). Some 34.1% of rated 
firms are defined by S&P as ‘Financial’, a sector which comprises primarily banks. As such we 
include sector dummies. Financial (Utilities) [Insurance] takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to 
the Financial (Utilities) [Insurance] sector, and 0 otherwise. The sector ‘Corporations’ is the 
baseline.
14
  
                                                          
13
 Explanations for this correlation in ratings include the fact that domestic banks tend to hold large amounts of 
domestic sovereign debt and that in times of crisis governments offer support to banks (see Correa, Lee, Sapriza & 
Suarez, 2013).  
14
 Supplementary Table S3, available online, sets out the mean values of key variables for each sovereign and in the 
final column the World Bank income status.  
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In addition to the selected sovereign- and firm-level characteristics we include the 
following sovereign action-level control variables: Sovrch takes a value of 1 for sovereign-rating 
changes and a value of 0 for outlook or credit watch changes. Williams et al. (2013) report that 
sovereign-rating changes have a more significant impact on the ratings of banks in developing 
countries. However, a number of studies demonstrate that outlook and credit watch changes reveal 
significant information about credit quality, and may be more timely than rating changes (see 
Alsakka and Ap Gwilym (2012) for a review of literature related to sovereign outlook and credit 
watch changes). Days is the natural log of the number of days since the last sovereign action in the 
same direction. Sovereign actions which are far apart might contain more information giving rise 
to a review of firm-level ratings. Alternatively, where sovereign actions are close together this is 
indicative of rapidly changing sovereign conditions which may lead to more firm-level changes. 
Multiple takes a value of 1 where the rating action was a multiple notch upgrade or downgrade. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Country-level spill-over statistics 
 
In this section, we investigate our first hypothesis, as stated in Section 2: 
H1: Since sovereign-rating actions have a direct impact on firm-level rating actions there is a 
large increase in the number of domestic firm rating actions from the pre to the post sovereign-
rating action period.   
 
The date of the sovereign (country) action is Day 0, and we split Day 0 into firm-level 
changes which occur before and after the sovereign action. Day 1 is the 24 hour period for the day 
after the sovereign change, and so on.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Very little firm-level activity occurs in the days prior to sovereign-rating actions with a 
sharp increase on Day 0 for many countries (Table 2); we find that 34% of Day 0 actions occur 
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within 1 hour of the sovereign-rating action (not tabulated). As such, Table 2 provides support for 
our first hypothesis that sovereign-rating actions lead to firm-level rating actions.
15
  
In Table 3 we report the proportion of firms which undergo a rating change in the wake of 
a sovereign action in the period (0, +3) days after the sovereign change
16
 and within one trading 
month – that is, the period (0, +21) days. We also calculate the proportion of firms that we expect 
to change their rating in the days immediately after the sovereign action, which is shown in Table 
3 under ‘[Exp. (0, 3)]’. This is based on a daily distribution of firm rating actions in proportion to 
the number of firms rated each day. Expectations of a domestic firm rating action in the (0, +3) 
window are between 0% and 1%, other than for Turkey (1.22%), and tend to lie closer to 0% than 
1%.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
The analysis presented in Table 3 provides further support for H1 since for 33 out of 34 
countries in our sample
17
 the proportion of firms which undergo a rating action in the same 
direction as the sovereign-rating action in the days immediately following a sovereign action is 
higher than would be expected based on an equal daily distribution.  
However, we find evidence of considerable heterogeneity across countries in the propensity 
of firms to undergo a rating action in response to a sovereign-rating action. For positive actions, 
Argentina, India and Turkey have the highest probability of sovereign spill-over, and for negative 
actions, Brazil, India and Turkey. Thus, for example, 63.7% (74.1%) of Argentinean firms 
undergo a positive rating action within 4 (22) days of a positive sovereign-rating action and 79.2% 
(81.5%) of Brazilian firms undergo a negative rating action within 4 (22) days of a negative 
sovereign-rating action. By comparison, the figures for positive sovereign spill-over are less than 
                                                          
15
 To support Table 2, in Supplementary Table S4 (available online) we explain how we deal with firm-level rating 
changes which occur in the windows of more than one sovereign change, and in Supplementary Table S5 (available 
online) we report the daily average number of firm-level changes across the same windows shown in Table 2 to 
provide an alternative picture based on the same data. 
16
 For most countries there is a considerable reduction in firm-level actions two days after the sovereign action (i.e. 
most firm-level actions occur in the (0, +1) window). However, for most Eurozone countries, firm-level actions occur 
in the (0, +3) window. Further analysis of the Eurozone countries reveals that the propensity for firm-level ratings to 
change following a sovereign rating change is dominated by the change to the ratings of financial institutions (banks) 
during the credit crisis, and this reaction usually follows the sovereign change with a delay of two to three days. 
17
 Denmark is the exception and in this case no firm level actions occur following a positive sovereign action 
(Denmark had no negative sovereign actions across our sample period). In the case of Portugal and New Zealand this 
is only true for negative sovereign rating actions (again for positive sovereign actions there were no firm-level actions 
for these countries.  
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1% ((0, +3) window) and 5% ((0, +21) window) for Canada, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, 
the UK and New Zealand. The figures for negative sovereign spill-over are less than or equal to 
1% ((0, +3) window) and 5% ((0, +21) window) for Germany, the UK and the USA (the USA has 
no positive sovereign-rating changes in the sample period).   
The results in Table 3 also indicate, on a country-by-country basis, where the impact of 
positive and negative sovereign-rating changes on domestic companies has been unequal and may 
therefore continue to be so. Thus, for example, over the (0, 21) window the probability of spill-
over for negative sovereign-rating changes for Brazil (Portugal) is 81.5% (48.7%), which 
compares with 39.9% (0.0%) for positive sovereign changes. Firm-level rating actions impact the 
cost of firm-level borrowing. As stated in the Introduction, the implied higher correlation between 
sovereign and firm-level ratings in times when countries are in crisis, versus when they are in 
recovery, may contribute to quicker and/or deeper crises versus slower and/or longer recoveries. 
Table 3 indicates that negative spill-over tends to be greater than positive spill-over, confirming 
the result of Borensztein et al. (2013) and contrary to the findings of Williams et al. (2013). 
However, our country-by-country results show that this is not the case for all countries, as 
illustrated by examples in the Introduction. Table 3 also indicates that spill-over tends to be 
greater for NHICs, confirming the result of Ferri et al. (2001). However, we demonstrate that 
there is considerable heterogeneity in sovereign spill-over within both HIC and NHIC status 
countries, again as illustrated by examples in the Introduction.  
 
4.2 Determinants of Sovereign Spill-over  
 
In this section we empirically examine the sovereign- and firm-level factors discussed in 
Section 3.2 which would theoretically be expected to impact the extent of spill-over.  
To determine which factors explain the spill-over of positive and negative sovereign-rating 
changes we undertake separate regressions for positive and negative actions. We do not consider 
reverse causality to be an issue since even at the height of the credit crisis any causality from the 
corporate sector to the sovereign did not occur quickly (see, e.g., Ejsing & Lemke (2011)) and the 
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data in Table 2 further demonstrate that there are very few firm-level actions prior to sovereign-
rating actions but a large increase in firm actions from the date of the sovereign action.
18
 
The results of the preliminary regression analyses are shown in Table 4 for positive sovereign 
actions (n = 6,445) and negative sovereign actions (n = 13,687).  
Insert Table 4 about here 
As anticipated given stock market volatility is a measure of uncertainty, we find that a higher 
level of recent stock market volatility is associated with increased (reduced) spill-over of negative 
(positive) sovereign credit rating changes into domestic firm credit ratings. Stock market returns 
are not significant in the negative actions model but for positive actions a more positive recent 
stock index performance increases the spill-over of sovereign credit rating changes into domestic 
corporate credit ratings across the (0, 3) window.  
Within country variations in the Wealth/Risk factor do not impact sovereign spill-over in the 
(0, 3) window. The results for the sovereign Wealth/Risk factor over the (0, 21) period suggest 
that, ceteris paribus, negative spill-over is higher when a country is in a wealthy low credit risk 
state whereas positive spill-over is lower when a country is in a wealthy low risk state. The former 
result is not as expected, since the findings of Ferri et al. (2001) suggest that sovereign spill-over 
decreases as wealth increases. However, our variable only captures time series (within country) 
elements of the Wealth/Risk factor. 
 Firms with better credit quality (a higher credit rating) are more affected by negative 
changes to the sovereign rating over the (0, 3) window, but not over the (0, 21) window. We argue 
that the former result would be expected where higher credit quality firms have greater access to 
foreign currency debt. This is counterbalanced by the greater access to resources which would 
allow them to better withstand a deterioration in sovereign conditions, which would explain the 
result over the (0, 21) window. 
                                                          
18
 Michaelides, Milidonis, Nishiotis and Papakyriakou (2015) report that information leakage prior to a sovereign re-
rating impacts the domestic stock market in the period prior to the sovereign re-rating, particularly in countries of 
lower institutional quality. However, this does not impact the relationship between sovereign and firm re-ratings, and 
Table 3 provides evidence that in terms of ratings, reverse causality is not an issue.  
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Listed firms are more vulnerable than non-listed firms to sovereign-rating changes for 
positive actions only – that is, the rating agencies are more likely to revise upwards (but not 
downwards) the ratings of listed firms. We argue that listed status would signal both greater 
visibility and better information quality. The higher positive spill-over for listed firms suggests 
that the rating agencies are more inclined to couple sovereign and firm risk because they have 
more confidence in the information provided by listed firms. We find no support for the theory 
that the rating agencies are more conservative with the ratings of more visible firms, which would 
affect negative spill-over.  
Holding the firm rating level constant, firms rated at parity with the sovereign have odds of 
undergoing a credit rating change in response to a sovereign-rating change of between 10.3 and 
32.7 times that of a firm rated below the sovereign rating. Firms rated above the sovereign rating 
have odds of undergoing a change of between 1.4 and 5.5 times that of a firm rated below the 
sovereign rating. The studies of Almeida et al. (2017) and Borensztein et al. (2013) do not make a 
distinction between firms rated at parity with the sovereign and firms rated above the sovereign 
rating, but the odds of spill-over are significantly higher for the former group, suggesting that the 
latter group are relatively more immune from sovereign spill-over.  
Finally, firms in the Financial (primarily banks) and Utilities sectors are more affected 
than ‘Corporations’ across both positive and negative actions. The regression analysis which 
supports our analysis of bias in Section 4.3 confirms that positive sovereign actions do not differ 
in their impact on Financial firms from negative sovereign actions (see Appendix 1). This 
contrasts with the finding of Williams et al. (2013) that positive sovereign actions have a greater 
impact on the banks domiciled within emerging market sovereigns than negative sovereign 
actions. We show that the concerns of Williams et al. (2013) about the impact of sovereign-rating 
actions on bank ratings in emerging markets apply equally to a sample of financial firms which 
includes developed markets. 
We undertake robustness checks of the results in Table 4 by employing different sub-
samples of our data. Specifically, we ensure that results are not driven by one or two economic 
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areas by excluding (i) EU countries and (ii) the USA and EU countries. We also report standard 
errors clustered by both firm and sovereign. We confirm that our results are robust to this change 
in the standard error calculation and the employment of these sub-samples.
19
 Sub-samples of 
investment and non-investment grade sovereigns are employed in Section 4.4 
 
 
4.3 Conditional Negative-Positive Bias 
In this section, we examine the relative impact of positive and negative sovereign-rating 
changes after controlling for firm and sovereign characteristics, which enables us to address our 
second and third hypotheses. 
As stated in the Introduction, where firms are more responsive to negative sovereign 
changes than positive sovereign changes, ceteris paribus, this may have unequal effects on the 
speed and depth of crises versus recoveries. Conditional negative bias (i.e. that which remains 
after allowing for firm-level and sovereign factors which determine the extent of spill-over) may 
be of particular interest to government finance ministers since it may indicate inequity in the re-
rating of firms due to a change in the sovereign rating.   
 To investigate negative or positive conditional bias we employ the sample of countries 
which underwent both negative and positive changes to their sovereign rating. We therefore omit 
the eight countries having neither one nor the other.
20
 We also remove countries with no firm-
level actions in a particular window,
21
 and this gives us different sample countries for the two 
windows. Our samples are therefore 9,152 firms across 18 countries for the (0, 3) window and 
10,608 firms across 22 countries for the (0, 21) model. As in Section 4.2, we begin our analysis of 
bias via a logistic regression analysis with Firm-action as the dependent variable. We create a 
positive sovereign action dummy variable (SovPos). We include appropriate control variables 
suggested by the results of the positive and negative regression analyses at 4.2 above – that is, 
                                                          
19
 These results are available online in Supplementary Tables S6 and S7. 
20
 Chile, Canada, the USA, Austria, France, Denmark, Sweden, Australia. See online Table S2. 
21
 The following countries had no firm level actions in the (0,3) [(0, 21)] window: (Belgium, Portugal, Spain, the UK, 
New Zealand) [Portugal, New Zealand]. Italy is also excluded from the (0, 3) analysis. See online Table S2. 
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StDev, Wealth/Risk factor, Firm Rating, Eq. Sov, > Sov., Listed, Financial, Utilities. We interact 
the positive sovereign action dummy variable with each sovereign country dummy and each 
control variable. In addition to country dummy variables, we include year dummy variables. 
Results for the logistic regression are shown in Appendix 1. 
To determine bias we require a reference country. The choice of a reference country does 
not affect any estimates of bias, nor the ranking of countries by bias, but the choice does impact 
whether we find that bias is significant.
22
 As such, we employ two alternative reference countries, 
Korea and Greece, since preliminary analyses show that for both countries no bias is evident 
across either window ((0, 3) or (0, 21)), and in addition the positive sovereign dummy variable 
(SovPos) takes a different sign for each country. We suggest that conclusive evidence of positive 
or negative bias requires significance relative to both reference countries.
23
  
In Table 5 we report our findings in respect of negative-positive conditional bias on a 
country-by-country basis. Bias is indicated in the column ‘Ratio’, which is the odds of negative 
sovereign spill-over for a particular country divided by the odds of positive spill-over. These odds 
are determined from the underlying regression coefficients in Appendix 1. Countries with ratios 
which exceed 1 have negative bias, and countries with ratios which are less than 1 have positive 
bias. A full description and example of the calculations accompany Table 5. Significant bias 
relative to Korea and Greece are indicated in the columns ‘KOR’ and ‘GRC’, respectively. Bias at 
the longer-term (0, 21) window reflects persistent bias, whereas bias at the (0, 3) window not 
accompanied by bias at the (0, 21) window reflects the relative speed with which negative and 
positive adjustments are made.  
                                                          
22
 Significance is measured relative to the reference case. 
23
 We employ Argentina against the reference case Korea to explain further. In our logistic regression analysis 
(Appendix C), across the (0, 3) window we omit a dummy variable for Korea, but include dummies for all other 
countries (e.g. ARG for Argentina) plus an interaction term for each country with SovPos (ARG x SovPos). The 
coefficient on SovPos represents the reference case, Korea, and this coefficient takes value of 0.232 (see Appendix C) 
and is far from significant (p = 0.847). We can then assess the significance of the coefficient on ARG x SovPos 
relative to the base case. We find in fact that the odds of positive spill-over are significantly greater for Argentina than 
Korea (again, see Appendix C). Since this significance is relative to Korea, which has a positive, albeit insignificant 
coefficient, we employ a robustness check with Greece in place of Korea. With Greece as the reference case SovPos 
has a highly insignificant but negative coefficient of –0.385, and again the odds of positive spill-over are significantly 
greater for Argentina.  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
25 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
First we note that for most countries, after allowing for firm and sovereign factors which 
determine spill-over, no significant negative or positive bias exists. This indicates that the 
unconditional negative bias we noted in relation to Table 5 can largely be explained by firm- and 
time-varying sovereign characteristics. However, conditional bias does exists for some countries.  
The results presented in Table 5 allow us to investigate our second hypothesis, as stated in 
Section 2: 
 
H2: Rating agency reputation relies on the timely identification of credit problems associated with 
negative changes to ratings, and this is reflected in conditional negative spill-over bias across all 
countries. 
 
 
Via H2 we expect conditional negative bias to occur for all countries under the assumption 
that the rating agencies seek to protect their reputation by being more proactive during negative 
actions. We find some support for H2 in that conditional negative bias occurs for more countries 
than positive bias. However, conditional negative bias is by no means universal.  
Specifically, Table 5 indicates conditional negative bias across the (0, 3) window for 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany and Hong Kong. This bias decreases considerably across the 
(0, 21) window, which therefore indicates that for these countries S&P is quicker to adjust firm 
ratings downwards following negative sovereign actions than to adjust them upwards following 
positive sovereign actions. These conclusions can be compared with those for, say, Colombia, 
where across the (0, 3) window there is no conditional bias but there is conditional negative bias 
across the (0, 21) window. Persistent conditional bias is likely to be of greater concern. Relative to 
other countries, after allowing for sovereign and firm characteristics, Spain has the largest 
persistent conditional negative spill-over bias, followed by Hong Kong, Indonesia, Colombia and 
Brazil. We find consistent evidence of persistent conditional negative bias for each of these 
countries, and some evidence of persistent conditional negative bias for the UK, Belgium and 
Ireland. 
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Significant short-term (0, 3) positive conditional bias is indicated for Argentina and 
Thailand (coefficients are significant relative to both reference countries). However, over the (0, 
21) window the conditional bias disappears for Thailand, which indicates that S&P is quicker to 
adjust firm ratings upwards after positive actions than downwards after negative actions, but no 
persistent bias is evident. The coefficient for the (0, 21) window for Argentina just fails to be 
significantly more positive than Greece at a 10% level (p-value = 12.8%), but as Greece has a 
small positive coefficient it is likely that persistent conditional positive bias does indeed exist for 
Argentina.  
Kim and Nabar (2007) show that the rating agencies wait longer to implement upgrades, 
and we suggest therefore that when a positive sovereign change does occur the rating agencies are 
confident that a recovery is under way and may therefore be willing to upgrade a greater 
proportion of firms. If this argument holds true then we might expect conditional positive bias to 
be particularly associated with Argentina’s recovery from default. However, the higher 
conditional positive (relative to negative) sovereign spill-over for Argentina occurs both before 
and after the Argentine default. 
Via H3 we expect conditional negative bias to be related to the likelihood of adverse 
government actions as a sovereign approaches default. Specifically, we argue: 
H3: The extent of sovereign spill-over is affected by adverse government actions when countries 
face default. Negative bias is greater for the sub-set of countries with a realistic prospect of 
default. 
 
Table 5 does not indicate that this is the case since conditional negative bias is by no 
means exclusive to countries with a realistic probability of default.  
Given our fixed effects country-by-country results fail to find support for H3, we employ 
additional analyses to provide further evidence. We classify all countries with a sub-investment 
grade rating as having a realistic prospect of default. We compare unconditional spill-over for 
investment versus sub-investment grade sovereigns. Since the rating of the firm relative to the 
sovereign is a key determinant of spill-over, we separately document spill-over for firms with 
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ratings < Sovereign, = Sovereign, > Sovereign. We also show the spill-over separately for positive 
and negative sovereign actions.  
 
Insert Panel A of Table 6 about here 
 
Panel A of Table 6 suggests that spill-over is higher for sub-investment grade sovereigns, 
across both positive and negative actions, and is higher for negative actions, as anticipated by H3.   
We now undertake a regression analysis. The expectation via H3 is that after controlling for 
firm-level characteristics and sovereign conditions, negative spill-over is greater for sub-
investment grade sovereigns.  
We employ a random effects model for this analysis given our desire to measure both 
within- and between-country effects. The sub-investment grade status (Sub-IG) of the sovereign 
enters the model and we do not also include the Wealth/Risk factor since this variable is highly 
(negatively) correlated with sub-investment grade status. We undertake the analysis across both 
the full sample employed in Table 4 (n = 20,132) and the sample with both positive and negative 
sovereign actions employed in the (0, 3) window in Table 5 (n = 9,152). The models are three 
level random effects models and 20,132 (9,152) firm ratings are nested in 304 (236) sovereign 
actions are nested in 32 (18) sovereigns.  
The key variable is the interaction between the sub-investment grade status of the 
sovereign and the direction of the sovereign-rating change. We do not employ cross-level 
interactions, which circumvents the bias inherent in such models (see Stegmueller, 2013). We 
employ SovNeg rather than SovPos to indicate the direction of the sovereign action in this model 
(the magnitude of the interaction term is entirely unaffected by this, but the interpretation of the 
coefficient is more intuitive), and thus the key variable is Sub-IG x SovNeg.  
Insert Panel B of Table 6 about here 
 The coefficients on the interaction between Sub-IG and SovNeg fail to be significant in 
any regression, which further supports our fixed effects country-by-country analysis of H3. We 
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fail to find evidence that conditional negative spill-over is greater for sub-investment grade 
sovereigns.  
However, we do find that the coefficient on Sub-IG tends to be significantly positive, 
which suggests that, ceteris paribus, spill-over (both negative and positive) to sub-investment 
grade sovereigns is greater.  
 4.4 Sovereign Ceiling Analysis 
Borensztein et al. (2013) and Almeida et al. (2017) classify firms rated above and at par 
with the sovereign rating as ‘bound’ firms, and argue that, via the sovereign ceiling principle, 
bound firms are significantly more likely to be affected by sovereign downgrades. Borensztein et 
al. (2013) argue that the primary reason for the operation of a sovereign ceiling is the likely 
implementation of capital controls in the event of a sovereign moving close to default. Via the 
arguments of Borensztein et al. (2013), firms with ratings at or above that of the sovereign (bound 
firms) are subject to greater spill-over, particularly following a negative sovereign action to a 
sovereign with a high prospect of default. We formulate our fourth hypothesis as follows: 
 
H4: Spill-over to firms rated at or above the sovereign ceiling is particularly acute for the 
negative actions of sovereigns which are closer to default.  
 
We add an additional dimension to the sovereign ceiling analysis of Borensztein et al. 
(2013) and Almeida et al. (2017) by distinguishing between those firms rated at parity with the 
sovereign (Eq. Sov.) and those firms rated above the sovereign rating (> Sov.). We compare the 
spill-over of sovereign-rating changes to domestic firms rated at and above the sovereign across 
the two groups of sovereigns (sub-investment/investment grade) and across events types (positive 
versus negative). The expectation is that the coefficients on the variables Eq. Sov. and > Sov. will 
be more positive (indicating greater sovereign spill-over) for negative sovereign-rating changes to 
sub-investment grade sovereigns.  
As an additional test we assess the impact of capital account openness (KAOpen) on the 
spill-over of sovereign-rating actions. The expectation is that KAOpen has a negative coefficient, 
with more openness reducing sovereign credit risk spill-over to domestic firms, particularly where 
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a lack of openness is coupled with a negative sovereign-rating action and a sub-investment grade 
sovereign rating (i.e. where capital controls are a more realistic prospect).  
We employ a fixed effects model in which we undertake separate analyses on sub-samples 
of sub-investment-grade-rated (n = 982 for positive actions, n = 1,329 for negative actions) and 
investment-grade-rated sovereigns (n = 5,116 for positive actions, n = 12,705 for negative 
actions). The fixed effects model allows us to measure the impact of sovereign specific time 
variations in KAOpen for investment and sub-investment grade sovereigns and to examine the 
operation of the sovereign ceiling in sub-investment and investment grade sovereigns. 
Our regressions include all of the variables employed in Table 4 other than the 
Wealth/Risk factor, which is replaced by one of its constituents, KAOpen. For the sake of clarity 
we only report coefficients for the variables representing capital account openness and the 
sovereign ceiling variables – that is, the firm rating being at or above the sovereign rating. As in 
earlier regressions, the firm rating is included to control for any re-rating owing to the credit risk 
of the firm as distinct from the firm rating being at or above the sovereign rating.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
After allowing for firm and sovereign characteristics, firms at parity with the sovereign rating 
are the most impacted by sovereign-rating changes across both investment and sub-investment 
grade sovereigns. The odds of sovereign spill-over to a firm rated at parity with the sovereign is 
higher for the negative actions of investment-grade sovereigns than for sub-investment grade 
sovereigns, once the impact of other firm and sovereign characteristics on sovereign spill-over 
have been accounted for. This suggests that the coupling of firm and sovereign ratings for firms at 
parity with the sovereign rating is related to the threat of adverse government action when the 
sovereign is still some way from default. Firms with ratings above the sovereign are relatively 
immune from sovereign spill-over. 
We find that reduced capital account openness leads to greater spill-over among sub-
investment grade sovereigns, which is as predicted by the prior literature. The result for 
investment grade sovereigns is of less importance to our analysis, since capital account openness 
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is of less consequence when sovereigns are not approaching default. However, we find the 
opposite effect to that expected, with (time series) increases in capital account openness 
increasing spill-over. 
5. Further Tests  
5.1 Spill-over to Non-Higher Income Countries Relative to Higher Income Countries 
Ferri et al. (2001) comment on the proposals put forward in 1999 by the newly formed 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, for the employment of external ratings in the 
calculation of bank capital asset requirements. They find that, in aggregate, companies in non-
high income countries (NHIC) are more affected by sovereign rating changes than those in high 
income countries (HIC) and they argue that a sovereign-rating downgrade would necessitate large 
increases in NHIC banks’ capital asset requirements at a time when capital is set to become 
scarce. Similarly, Borenzstein et al. (2013) report higher spill-over for developing economies 
relative to developed economies. 
However, Ferri et al. fail to control for firm and sovereign characteristics, and Borenzstein 
et al. take no evident account of the relative timing of sovereign- and firm-level actions by 
assuming that sovereign and firm-level actions at any time within the same calendar year are 
related. In this section we therefore re-examine aggregate spill-over to firms domiciled in NHICs 
relative to firms domiciled in HICs, after allowing for firm characteristics and the sovereign 
environment, and for the relative timing of firm and sovereign events. 
Again, we employ a random effects model for this analysis, given our desire to measure 
both within- and between-country effects. The HIC status (HIC) of the sovereign enters the model 
and we do not also include the Wealth/Risk factor, again since this variable is highly correlated 
with HIC status. We employ the interaction between SovPos and StDev given the opposite effect 
of stock market volatility for positive and negative events. Otherwise our variables are those 
included in Table 4.   
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We undertake the analysis across the full sample employed in Table 4 (n = 20,132). The 
models are three level random effects models and 20,132 firm ratings are nested in 304 sovereign 
actions are nested in 32 sovereigns. The results are in Table 8.  
Insert Table 8 about here 
The key variable in our regression is HIC, and since this is significantly negative in both 
models (see Panel A of Table 8) it indicates that spill-over to HICs, both positive and negative, is 
lower than to NHICs, ceteris paribus. This result confirms the arguments of Ferri et al., since the 
spill-over bias in relation to NHICs holds after allowing for firm characteristics and sovereign 
conditions.  
The results in Section 4.3 suggest that NHICs are not more affected by negative spill-over 
bias, a result which we confirm by adding an interaction term between SovPos and HIC (see Panel 
B of Table 8). The coefficient on this interaction term fails to be significant. 
5.2 Default Correlation Bias 
We examine a source of potential bias not previously examined – that is, whether the 
strength of the link between sovereign- and firm-level S&P credit ratings is underpinned by the 
strength of the relationship between firm and sovereign defaults. If S&P is unbiased in its linking 
of sovereign and corporate credit ratings, then such linkage should be determined by the link 
between sovereign and corporate defaults, given that credit ratings reflect default risk. Sovereign 
and firm default actions are not rating agency determined. Data through to May 2013 are 
employed to investigate the incidence of firm-level defaults following a sovereign default. 
Across the entire history of S&P’s sovereign ratings there are only seventeen default ratings 
assigned to sovereigns, only five of which relate to our sample countries (all within our sample 
period); one each to Argentina and Greece and three to Indonesia. This low incidence of sovereign 
defaults reflects the date at which our sample of countries first obtained a S&P foreign currency 
sovereign rating which tends to be the late 1980s/early 1990s for those countries with a high level 
of spill-over of sovereign credit risk, thereby missing the debt crises of the 1980s. At the height of 
the South East Asian crisis, (impacting particularly Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea), 
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Thailand and South Korea had minimum sovereign ratings of BBB– and B+, respectively. Thus 
our potential sample for this investigation is small. Nonetheless, we provide what evidence we can 
of the relationship between sovereign-rating spill-over and sovereign default spill-over.  
  In Table 9 we provide details of negative firm-level actions around the time of each 
sovereign default. We find little evidence of firm-level re-ratings in response to sovereign 
defaults, but then given sovereign defaults are not rating agency determined, the contemporaneous 
determination of sovereign and firm-level ratings does not apply. We find that the one year default 
rate for firms rated at the time of the sovereign default is 80% for Argentina, but varies from 0% 
to 62% across the three sovereign defaults by Indonesia and is 10% for Greece. There is a decline 
in the rating agencies’ tendency to re-rate firms from Argentina to Indonesia to Greece (see Table 
3) and thus Table 9 suggests that the relative firm-level default rates contingent upon sovereign 
default, reflect the relative spill-over of sovereign re-ratings into firm-level re-ratings. Our 
analysis, albeit very limited in scope, shows no evidence of rating agency bias in relation to firm-
sovereign default correlations. 
 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Our analysis provides a novel picture of the relationship between sovereign-level rating 
actions and firm-level rating actions on a day-by-day and country-by-country basis, highlighting 
both the extent and timing of sovereign spill-over. This granular approach is particularly useful to 
banks and investors with loans and investments in different countries, to determine the extent of 
their exposure to sovereign credit risk channelled via the sovereign credit rating. 
We show that while in aggregate there is a considerable increase in the number of firm-
level actions in the days immediately following the sovereign-rating change, there is considerable 
variation in the extent of sovereign spill-over between countries. We undertake analyses of spill-
over both before and after allowing for firm and sovereign characteristics.  
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Prior to allowing for firm characteristics and sovereign conditions, most countries suffer 
from a negative bias in sovereign spill-over, but not all (e.g. South Africa, Argentina). We then 
show that for most countries any bias between the impact of negative and positive sovereign-
rating actions can be accounted for by firm and sovereign characteristics. However, after 
accounting for firm and sovereign characteristics, persistent negative bias remains for some 
countries (Spain, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Colombia and Brazil).  
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Table 1: Sovereign and Firm Ratings Data 
Table 1 shows the dates of the first sovereign and domestic firm foreign currency ratings (Columns 2 and 3), the number of firms rated and the mean firm 
and sovereign rating at the end of the sample period (Columns 4–6). The mean firm rating is calculated employing the numerical values set out in the text 
(AAA = 21) which is then reconverted to the nearest rating. Issuers with a long-term rating ‘NR’ (no rating), ‘R’ (under regulatory supervision) ‘SD’ and 
‘D’ (in default) ratings are excluded from the number of firms and calculation of the mean rating. However, the number of firms with a default rating is 
shown in parentheses. Where the mean firm rating value is exactly between two ratings both ratings are shown. Columns 7 – 10 summarize the percentage 
of positive and negative rating actions (both sovereign and firm) over our sample period for each country. Columns 1, 7, 11 and 12 hold the primary data 
for subsequent analyses. Across the eligible sample of 34 countries (Column 1), 20,407 domestic firms (Column 11) hold a rating at the start of each day 
on each of the 313 days (Column 7) when the sovereign rating is changed in the period June 1996 through to the close of May 2012. 6,574 firms 
contribute the 20,407 firm ratings (Column 12).  
 
Sovereign defaults are shown in parentheses in Column 7 as follows (Argentina = 1; Greece = 1; Indonesia = 3). Firm-level actions which occurred during 
periods when the sovereign was in default are excluded. The following rating actions are also excluded: the first rating, withdrawn ratings, the first rating 
following a withdrawn rating, the first rating following a default, rating changes between categories of default, outlook changes to and from developing 
status.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Sovereign Date 1st  
sovereign 
rating 
Date of 
first firm 
rating(s) 
No. firms 
rated 
(default) 
29/05/12 
Mean firm 
rating 
29/05/12 
Sovereig
n rating 
29/05/12 
N. Sov. 
Rating 
Actions 
2002–12 
% Pos 
2002–12 
N. Firm 
Rating 
Actions 
2002–12 
% Pos 
2002–12 
Firm 
ratings  
No. 
firms 
Latin America           
Argentina 25/08/93 14/01/94 20 (1) B  B  19 (1) 32% 520 33% 555 55 
Brazil 30/11/94 31/05/96 100 (2) BB+ BBB 18 78% 769 67% 831 128 
Chile 17/08/92 08/11/93 30 BBB A+ 5 100% 211 45% 136 40 
Colombia 21/06/93 17/12/93 12 BBB– BBB– 10 50% 75 47% 74 16 
Mexico 29/07/92 22/10/92 57 BB+ BBB 11 73% 583 52% 482 91 
North America           
Canada 24/08/49 07/04/54 254 BBB–/BBB AAA 2 100% 2,061 40% 346 264 
USA 01/01/41 18/05/23 2,641 (9) BB+ AA+ 3 0% 31,055 41% 7,762 2,665 
Eurozone            
Austria 09/07/75 18/09/76 18 A– AA+ 2 0% 119 29% 36 18 
Belgium 26/10/88 19/01/94 24 BBB/ BBB+ AA 4 25% 135 33% 91 23 
France 25/06/75 24/11/59 163 (1) BBB+ AA+ 2 0% 1,576 37% 317 159 
Germany 17/08/83 17/08/83 1,291 AA–  AAA 2 50% 2,727 73% 2,672 1,336 
Greece 09/09/88 28/01/97 10 B– CCC 18 (1) 33% 189 25% 212 23 
Ireland 01/10/88 24/11/88 45 (3) BBB BBB+ 12 33% 436 37% 437 56 
Italy 23/11/88 28/07/89 68 (1) BBB– BBB+ 9 11% 701 30% 542 114 
Luxembourg 28/04/94 21/07/87 46 BB+ AAA 2 50% 385 41% 95 48 
Netherlands 01/10/88 01/03/83 94 BBB AAA 2 50% 886 38% 183 92 
Portugal 01/10/88 09/11/93 15 BB– BB 13 15% 215 29% 166 20 
Spain 01/08/88 23/05/91 39 BB+ BBB+ 12 33% 404 31% 373 56 
Other Europe           
Denmark 01/03/81 15/10/81 16 BBB+ AAA 2 100% 94 46% 7 5 
Sweden 27/10/77 22/07/80 48 BBB+ AAA 3 100% 394 45% 109 57 
UK 05/05/58 05/05/58 251 BBB AAA 2 50% 2,386 35% 450 242 
Asia Emerging           
China 20/02/92 17/10/94 72 BBB– AA– 10 80% 349 46% 255 65 
Hong Kong 23/10/88 20/09/88 50 BBB+/A– AAA 12 83% 367 49% 422 69 
India 13/09/90 20/09/95 25 BB+/BBB– BBB– 15 53% 183 49% 188 31 
Indonesia 20/07/92 29/09/93 25 (1) BB– BB+ 22 (3) 50% 271 37% 367 57 
Korea 01/10/88 13/09/90 54 BBB+/ A– A 12 58% 398 61% 224 47 
Malaysia 08/03/89 11/06/93 15 BBB+ A– 15 47% 139 53% 118 19 
Taiwan 20/04/89 24/10/95 39 BBB+ AA– 7 29% 170 46% 180 47 
Thailand 14/06/89 07/06/94 17 BBB BBB+ 12 50% 179 48% 166 25 
Turkey 04/05/92 22/12/93 15 BB–/BB BB 29 52% 231 54% 279 21 
Pacific            
Australia 27/02/57 01/08/85 148 BBB+ AAA 3 100% 1,502 43% 399 207 
New Zealand 29/09/61 16/01/89 47 (1) BBB/ BBB+ AA 6 33% 362 37% 246 75 
Other            
Japan 22/01/59 14/04/61 134 A AA– 10 30% 1,539 53% 1,602 381 
South Africa 03/10/94 07/07/95 19 BB/BB+ BBB+ 7 71% 98 46% 85 22 
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Table 2: Relative Timing of Sovereign and Firm-level Rating Actions 
We document the number of firm rating actions in the same direction as the sovereign-rating action for periods around the sovereign action. We also 
document the number of firm-level actions in the opposite direction to the sovereign for the period (–22, +21) relative to the sovereign actions. 
Finally, we document the number of firm-level actions in any direction for all periods outside the period (–22, +21) relative to the sovereign actions, 
denoted ‘Any Direction, Rest of Year’. We confirm that there are no sovereign foreign currency rating actions to our sample countries in May 1996 
and thus no firm actions in our sample period are related to sovereign actions just prior to our sample period. Each firm action is assigned to only one 
sovereign action (see Supplementary Table S4, available online). Where multiple actions occur for each firm, each one is included. An alternative 
presentation of these data, employing daily averages, is shown in Supplementary Table S5, available online 
 
.  Same Direction as Sovereign Opposite 
Direction  
Any 
Direction 
Column No. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Country N 
actions 
(–22, –3) (– 2) (–1) 0 before 0 after (+1) (+2) (+3) (+4, +21) (–22, +21) Rest of 
Year 
Latin America            
Argentina 520 26 0 0 0 162 122 27 17 63 33 70 
Brazil 769 29 1 0 0 220 114 1 2 57 22 323 
Chile 211 2 0 0 0 10 7 0 1 3 2 186 
Colombia 75 1 0 0 3 23 3 8 0 5 2 30 
Mexico 583 16 3 4 2 118 13 4 0 8 19 396 
North America            
Canada 2,061 7 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 30 0 2,022 
USA 31,055 78 1 1 7 1 44 18 1 120 374 30,410 
Eurozone             
Austria 119 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 0 7 103 
Belgium 135 0 0 0 2 0 1 5 2 4 1 120 
France 1,576 5 0 0 0 0 0 62 4 57 10 1,438 
Germany 2,727 5 0 1 0 0 0 8 7 16 1184* 1,506 
Greece 189 3 0 0 0 10 13 16 3 10 15 119 
Ireland 436 30 0 1 0 6 4 10 16 16 19 334 
Italy 701 17 3 0 4 7 1 67 6 64 17 515 
Luxembourg 385 7 0 0 1 0 0 5 3 5 6 358 
Netherlands 886 4 0 0 0 0 1 6 8 8 8 851 
Portugal 215 4 0 0 0 16 5 24 15 20 6 125 
Spain 404 15 14 0 0 1 0 17 17 45 12 283 
Other Europe            
Denmark 94 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 93 
Sweden 394 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 387 
UK 2,386 16 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 11 18 2,339 
Asia Emerging            
China 349 13 2 0 2 38 10 2 0 5 7 270 
Hong Kong 367 6 3 0 2 48 28 1 2 7 17 253 
India 183 6 0 1 2 97 13 12 0 2 3 47 
Indonesia 271 6 0 0 17 39 21 25 6 19 10 128 
Korea 398 24 4 0 7 60 13 7 1 21 6 255 
Malaysia 139 3 1 1 4 31 8 0 4 11 2 74 
Taiwan 170 4 0 1 0 2 8 0 0 12 6 137 
Thailand 179 1 0 0 9 31 18 0 0 13 6 101 
Turkey 231 2 0 0 7 81 50 16 17 31 14 13 
Pacific             
Australia 1,502 2 1 0 1 10 11 1 0 16 19 1,441 
New Zealand 362 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 8 17 330 
Other             
Japan 1,539 54 10 14 13 44 17 1 2 67 36 1,281 
South Africa 98 2 0 1 0 9 18 3 0 4 0 61 
Total 51,709 390 45 27 84 1,070 546 349 140 758 1,901* 46,399 
 
*As would be expected, firm-level actions tend to be in the same direction as the sovereign action and, with the exception of one case, the number of firm-
actions in the same direction as the sovereign action significantly outweigh those in the opposite direction. The one exception relates to Germany; on 5 
December 2011 the German sovereign rating was put on credit watch negative and on the same day 1,177 out of 1,336 rated German firms underwent a 
positive rating action. We do not consider these actions to be sovereign related since the direction of the firm-level actions differs from that of the 
sovereign action. S&P issued a press release on 5 December 2011 explaining that it had applied new rating criteria to the German Cooperative Banking 
Sector on this date (in turn these criteria were published on 9 November 2011) and this accounts for the large number of positive firm-level rating actions 
for Germany on 5 December 2011.  
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Table 3: Unconditional Impact of Sovereign Rating on Firm Ratings 
This table presents the percentage of domestic firms which undergo rating actions in the same direction as the sovereign-rating action within the time 
frames (0, 3) days and (0, 21) days of the sovereign-rating action. For Day 0, only firm-level actions which occur after the sovereign action are included. 
The figures are illustrated in respect of positive actions for Argentina, as follows: 135 Argentinean firms held a rating at the start of the day across all days 
on which Argentinean positive sovereign-rating actions occurred. 86 domestic firms underwent at least one positive rating action within 3 days of a 
positive sovereign action. On average, 63.7% (86/135) of domestic firms underwent positive actions when the sovereign underwent a positive action. We 
also calculate the proportion of firms expected to undergo a rating action in a 4-day period, [Exp. (0, 3)]. The calculation of this last figure is shown in the 
note below the table. 
 
   Positive Actions  Negative Actions 
 HIC Firms 
Rated 
% change 
(0,3) 
% change 
(0, 21) 
Exp. 
(0, 3)# 
Firms 
Rated 
% change 
(0,3) 
% change 
(0, 21) 
Exp. 
(0,3) 
Latin America 
Argentina  No 135 63.7% 74.1% 0.93% 420 57.6% 59.0% 1.84% 
Brazil No 701 33.4% 39.9% 1.00% 130 79.2% 81.5% 0.48% 
Chile Yes 136 13.2% 15.4% 0.35% No negative sov action 
Colombia No 30 43.3% 46.7% 0.48% 44 47.7% 54.5% 0.55% 
Mexico No 337 29.1% 30.6% 0.63% 145 25.5% 26.9% 0.59% 
North America 
Canada Yes 346 0.6% 9.0% 0.39% No negative sov action 
USA Yes No positive sov action  7,762 0.8% 2.4% 0.68% 
Eurozone 
Austria Yes No positive sov action  36 25.0% 25.0% 0.62% 
Belgium Yes 23 0.0% 8.7% 0.30% 68 11.8% 14.7% 0.60% 
France Yes No positive sov action  317 20.8% 38.8% 0.66% 
Germany Yes 1,336 0.1% 1.0% 0.37% 1,336 1.0% 1.3% 0.13% 
Greece Yes 57 17.5% 24.6% 0.42% 155 20.6% 24.5% 1.24% 
Ireland Yes 101 3.0% 12.9% 0.54% 336 9.8% 11.6% 0.92% 
Italy Yes 20 5.0% 5.0% 0.40% 522 15.3% 27.4% 0.93% 
Luxembourg Yes 47 0.0% 10.6% 0.58% 48 16.7% 16.7% 0.85% 
Netherlands Yes 92 4.3% 12.0% 0.45% 91 12.1% 12.1% 0.72% 
Portugal Yes 12 0.0% 0.0% 0.52% 154 39.0% 48.7% 1.24% 
Spain Yes 95 0.0% 1.1% 0.44% 278 12.6% 24.1% 0.97% 
Other Europe 
Denmark Yes 7 0.0% 0.0% 0.43% No negative sov action 
Sweden Yes 109 1.8% 1.8% 0.41% No negative sov action 
UK Yes 229 0.0% 2.2% 0.39% 221 0.5% 3.2% 0.72% 
Asia Emerging 
China No 226 18.1% 19.9% 0.58% 29 31.0% 31.0% 0.67% 
Hong Kong na 374 16.3% 16.8% 0.48% 48 37.5% 47.9% 0.51% 
India No 99 60.6% 61.6% 0.62% 89 69.7% 70.8% 0.64% 
Indonesia No 186 15.1% 19.4% 0.56% 181 34.8% 36.5% 0.95% 
Korea Yes 145 25.5% 37.2% 0.70% 79 55.7% 60.8% 0.44% 
Malaysia No 61 31.1% 44.3% 0.60% 57 42.1% 43.9% 0.54% 
Taiwan Yes 66 1.5% 3.0% 0.33% 114 7.9% 17.5% 0.39% 
Thailand No 83 32.5% 34.9% 0.58% 83 26.5% 39.8% 0.62% 
Turkey No 148 50.0% 64.9% 1.22% 131 68.7% 69.5% 1.02% 
Pacific 
Australia Yes 399 5.5% 9.5% 0.43% No negative sov action 
New Zealand Yes 70 0.0% 0.0% 0.36% 176 2.3% 6.3% 0.61% 
Other 
Japan Yes 839 2.6% 6.9% 0.50% 763 5.5% 9.6% 0.44% 
South Africa Yes 49 38.8% 44.9% 0.42% 36 30.6% 33.3% 0.50% 
# The number of firms rated at the start of each working day summed over our sample period for Argentina is 75,043 (this excludes periods when the 
sovereign is in default). 135 firms are rated on sovereign-rating action days and there are a total of 174 positive firm actions (see Table 1, Columns 9 & 
10: 174/520 = 0.334). There should be 135/75,043 x 174 positive firm actions = 0.313 positive firm rating actions on the sovereign-rating action days and 
4  0.313 = 1.252 positive firm actions across all the (0, +3) periods around the sovereign actions. As a proportion of firms rated on sovereign-rating 
action days this is 1.252 / 135 = 0.93%. This expectation assumes that positive and negative actions are not mutually exclusive and one action per firm in 
the (0, +3) window (multiple changes to the same firm in the wake of the sovereign action are rare over the (0, 3) window).  
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Table 4 
Determinants of the Likelihood of Firm-level Actions 
We estimate the impact of firm characteristics and the sovereign environment on sovereign credit risk spill-over to domestic firms. We employ logit models and our 
dependent variable, Firm-action, takes a value of 1 if the firm experiences a rating action in the same direction as the sovereign action within (i) (0, 3) days or (ii) (0, 
21) days of the sovereign action, and 0 otherwise. We estimate separate models for positive and negative actions. Since the data are nested we produce standard error 
estimates by clustering at the sovereign level – that is, the highest level of aggregation at which the data might be correlated (see, e.g., Thompson, 2011). Robustness 
checks employing two-way clustering at both the firm and sovereign level produce very similar standard errors estimates. A more detailed discussion of 
methodological issues can be found in Section 3.2. The Wealth/Risk Factor is derived from a principal components analysis of correlated sovereign variables (the 
sovereign rating; World Bank indices for government effectiveness, regulatory quality, corruption and the rule of law; GDP per capita and the capital account 
openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008)). Return and StDev are the returns and volatility on the sovereign stock market index in the 3 months prior to the sovereign-
rating action. GDP Growth is geometric average annual growth in GDP employing 3 years’ data, Firm Rating is the numerical value of the rating of the firm (AAA = 
21), EqSov indicates a firm has a credit rating equal to the sovereign and >Sov indicates a firm has a rating greater than the sovereign credit rating. Listed indicates 
that a firm has been listed. Financial (Utilities) [Insurance] are dummy variables indicating that a firm belongs to the Financial (Utilities) [Insurance] sector. The 
sector ‘Corporations’ is the baseline. Days, Sov Rch and Multinotch are control variables relating to the nature of the sovereign credit rating action. 
 
 Positive Actions Negative Actions 
Variable Coefficient z-stat. Coefficient z-stat. Coefficient z-stat. Coefficient z-stat. 
Dependent (0, 3) (0, 21) (0, 3) (0, 21) 
Intercept –4.8127 –2.54** –0.7060 –0.70 –10.3505 –6.94*** –4.1723 –5.93*** 
Wealth/Risk Factor –0.4252 –0.99 –0.8619 –2.81*** –0.2181 –0.45 0.7909 2.02** 
StDev –5.7473 –6.69*** –3.7002 –3.54*** 4.8265 3.23*** 5.1344 4.59*** 
Return 1.3976 1.68* 0.3647 0.54 0.5959 0.54 0.3401 0.75 
GDP Growth –0.6977 –0.69 –1.8896 –2.31** –0.1422 –0.18 –0.1609 –0.21 
Firm Rating 0.0656 0.67 –0.0209 –0.38 0.2688 4.28*** 0.0588 1.08 
Eq. Sov. 3.4887 7.34*** 2.7244 13.72*** 2.3307 6.85*** 2.5986 6.13*** 
> Sov. 1.7083 2.50** 1.0987 3.47*** 0.3184 0.79 0.8567 1.97** 
Listed 0.4950 3.56*** 0.6312 4.45*** 0.3289 1.59 0.0829 0.46 
Financial 0.8817 2.23** 0.9543 3.40*** 1.2548 4.64*** 1.0775 3.82*** 
Insurance –0.3561 –0.25 0.6028 1.00 –0.6212 –1.41 –0.1837 –0.35 
Utilities 0.5576 1.83* 0.3509 1.57 0.8229 2.40** 0.6791 2.33** 
Days –0.0446 –0.31 –0.1597 –1.46 –0.1234 –1.13 –0.1217 –1.98** 
Sov. Rch. –0.1247 –0.55 0.0138 0.06 –0.5556 –1.59 –0.2946 –1.93* 
MultiNotch 0.5793 1.03 0.8835 1.21 0.5626 0.73 0.6624 1.27 
Country Dummies
#
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Max rescaled R Sqr. 0.6526  0.5678  0.6769  0.5680  
Obs. 6,445  6,445  13,687  13,687  
# To allow valid model estimates we exclude country dummies where no firm–level actions occur. This only affects positive sovereign actions. 
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Table 5 
Country-level Negative or Positive Bias in Sovereign Spill-over 
We investigate the negative or positive bias for each country across both the (0, 3) and (0, 21) windows. The bias is given by the column ‘Ratio’ which shows the 
relative odds of negative to positive spill-over. The ratio is calculated before rounding and hence does not result from the ‘Odds Neg.’ and ‘Odds Pos.’ columns 
which are the rounded odds of negative and positive spill-over. Countries with ratios which exceed 1 have negative bias and countries with ratios which are less than 
1 have positive bias. This bias is only significant if this is indicated in the ‘KOR REF’ and GRC REF’ columns, which refer to significance relative to the reference 
countries Korea and Greece.  
We derive the country level bias from a logistic regression analysis where our dependent variable, Firm-action, takes a value of 1 if the firm experiences a 
rating action in the same direction as the sovereign action and 0 otherwise. This regression analysis is shown in Appendix 1 (with Korea as a reference country). We 
examine both positive and negative actions in one regression employing a positive sovereign action dummy variable, SovPos. Country codes are as shown in 
Appendix 2. We illustrate the bias calculations via Appendix 1 as follows: With Korea as a reference country for the (0, 3) window, the key coefficients are as 
follows: Intercept = –3.3154, the dummy variable for Argentina (ARG) = –0.7137, the variable SovPos = 0.2323, ARG x SovPos = 1.8688. This last is significant at a 
5% level. Thus the odds of negative spill-over for an Argentinean firm over the (0, 3) window is given by exp(–3.3154 –0.7137) and the odds of positive spill-over 
for an Argentinean firm over the (0, 3) window is given by exp(–3.3154 –0.7137+0.2323 +1.8688). Without rounding this leads to a ratio of 0.122. The odds of 
positive spill-over for an Argentinean firm, relative to a Korean firm, are positive and significant at a 5% level (**). The coefficients using Greece as a base country 
lead to identical calculations of the odds but different levels of significance. Thus with Greece as a reference country the coefficient on the interaction (SovPos x 
ARG) is significant at a 10% level (*). The coefficient values for SovPos representing Korea and Greece are shown in Table 5; they lie either side of zero and neither 
is significant. Countries which do not have both positive and negative actions cannot be included in this analysis. We estimate our model (again see Appendix 1) 
across both the (0, 3) and (0, 21) windows. The samples are 9,152 firm ratings across 18 countries for the (0, 3) window and 10,608 firm ratings across 22 countries 
for the (0, 21) window (see Table S2, available online, for full sample details). 
(0, 3) Window (0, 21) Window 
Variable/ 
Country 
Code 
Odds 
Neg. 
Odds 
Pos. Ratio 
KOR 
REF. 
GRC 
REF. 
Variable/ 
Country 
Code 
Odds 
Neg. 
Odds 
Pos. Ratio 
KOR 
REF. 
GRC 
REF. 
SovPos    0.232 –0.385 SovPos    –0.093 0.0218 
ARG 0.018 0.145 0.122 ** * ARG 0.046 0.200 0.230 **  
CHN 0.005 0.026 0.173 
  
TUR 0.023 0.068 0.342 *  
THA 0.014 0.065 0.214 * 
 
CHN 0.008 0.021 0.395   
TUR 0.013 0.052 0.239 
  
JPN 0.051 0.109 0.466   
ZAF 0.012 0.030 0.408 
  
MYS 0.043 0.069 0.624   
IND 0.015 0.034 0.434 
  
ITA 0.131 0.201 0.654   
MYS 0.016 0.027 0.586 
  
DEU 0.006 0.009 0.663   
COL 0.013 0.017 0.768 
  
ZAF 0.029 0.038 0.775   
KOR 0.036 0.046 0.793 N/A 
 
GRC 0.136 0.139 0.978  N/A 
MEX 0.039 0.049 0.804 
  
KOR 0.097 0.089 1.098 N/A  
GRC 0.087 0.060 1.469 
 
N/A THA 0.059 0.049 1.222   
JPN 0.014 0.009 1.500 
  
MEX 0.072 0.051 1.417   
BRA 0.059 0.039 1.522 
  
IND 0.040 0.021 1.971   
IDN 0.031 0.010 3.003 
  
NLD 0.220 0.106 2.066   
HKG 0.453 0.065 6.985 * *** IRL 0.134 0.047 2.837  ** 
DEU 0.007 0.001 9.323 * *** BEL 0.173 0.056 3.070  * 
NLD 0.336 0.019 17.898 * *** GBR 0.140 0.034 4.090  ** 
IRL 0.096 0.003 28.352 *** *** BRA 0.162 0.035 4.686 ** * 
      COL 0.078 0.013 5.958 *** ** 
      IDN 0.050 0.008 6.268 **  
      HKG 1.242 0.179 6.948 ** *** 
      ESP 0.151 0.017 8.799 ** *** 
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Table 6:  
Spill-over in Investment and Sub-investment Grade Sovereigns  
In Panel A we present the probability that a firm undergoes a rating action in the wake of a sovereign action across both the (0, 3) and (0, 21) windows in Investment 
and Sub-investment grade sovereigns. We control for the firm rating relative to the sovereign, which is a key determinant of spill-over (see Table 4). The total 
number of firm-level observations includes Luxembourg and Taiwan (275 observations), omitted from the regression analyses due to a lack of data. We indicate 
separately 17 firm-level observations rated at AAA Stable in the case of positive sovereign actions since they cannot undergo positive actions in response to a 
sovereign action. In Panel B we run random effects logistic regression analyses where our dependent variable, Firm-action, takes a value of 1 if the firm experiences 
a rating action in the same direction as the sovereign action within (i) (0, 3) days or (ii) (0, 21) days of the sovereign action, and 0 otherwise. The variables we 
employ are as defined for Table 4. However, in place of the Wealth/Risk Factor we employ Sub-IG, a dummy indicating sub-investment grade status. We pool 
positive and negative actions and we employ the interactions of sub-investment grade status with the direction of the sovereign action (Sub-IG x SovPos). This is the 
key variable. Across all sovereigns, 20,132 firm ratings are nested in 304 sovereign actions are nested in 32 sovereigns. Across sovereigns with both positive and 
negative actions, 9,152 firm ratings are nested in 236 sovereign actions are nested in 18 sovereigns. Coefficients on other variables reported in Table 4 are not 
reported for the sake of clarity (also not shown is the interaction of the volatility of the stock market with the direction of the sovereign action). 
 
Panel A: Spill-over for Investment and Sub-investment Grade Sovereigns Conditioned on Firm Rating Relative to 
Sovereign. 
 
Dependent < Sovereign = Sovereign > Sovereign 
All ratings 
available to 
change 
AAA Stable 
Investment grade sovereigns: Positive actions 
N 4,545 574 93 5,212 17 
Firm Action (0, 3) 1.19% 48.78% 5.38% 6.50% 0% 
Firm Action (0, 21) 3.87% 52.79% 10.75% 9.38% 0% 
Investment grade sovereigns: Negative actions 
N 12,255 498 114 12,867 n.a. 
Firm Action (0, 3) 2.56% 64.46% 19.30% 5.11%  
Firm Action (0, 21) 5.40% 69.48% 24.56% 8.05%  
Sub-investment grade sovereigns: Positive actions 
N 395 699 235 1,329 0 
Firm Action (0, 3) 4.81% 65.24% 29.79% 41.01%  
Firm Action (0, 21) 12.15% 70.96% 35.74% 47.25%  
Sub-investment grade sovereigns: Negative actions 
N 248 453 281 982 n.a. 
Firm Action (0, 3) 22.58% 76.16% 58.01% 57.43%  
Firm Action (0, 21) 27.82% 77.70% 58.72% 59.67%  
 
Panel B: Extract from Random Effects Model of Spill-over for Investment and Sub-investment Grade Sovereigns 
Conditioned on Multiple Factors. 
 
 All Sovereigns Sovereigns with Both Positive and Negative Events 
Variable Coefficient z-stat. Coefficient z-stat. Coefficient z-stat. Coefficient z-stat. 
Dependent (0, 3) (0, 21) (0, 3) (0, 21) 
Sub_IG 1.4343 3.45*** 0.7576 2.48** 0.8207 2.09** 0.4975 1.58 
SovNeg –0.5041 –0.99 –0.6510 –1.69* –0.8000 –1.50 –0.9515 –2.18** 
Sub_IG x SovNeg –0.0542 –0.12 –0.3398 –0.99 0.0336 0.08 –0.0355 –0.10 
Obs.  20,132  20,132  9,152  9,152 
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Table 7 
Sovereign Ceiling Analysis: 
Fixed Effect Regression Analyses on Sub-samples of Investment and Non-investment Grade Sovereigns 
In Table 7 we assess the impact of spill-over on the variables representing the firm rating relative to the sovereign (EqSov, >Sov) via sub-samples of sub-investment 
grade and investment grade sovereigns. We run fixed effects logistic regression analyses where our dependent variable, Firm-action, takes a value of 1 if the firm 
experiences a rating action in the same direction as the sovereign action within (i) (0, 3) days or (ii) (0, 21) days of the sovereign action, and 0 otherwise. The 
variables we employ are as defined for Table 4. In place of the Wealth/Risk Factor we employ KAOpen, the capital account openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008). 
We also assess the impact of within country changes in capital account openness (KaOpen).  
 
 
 
Positive Actions 
Sov. Investment Grade 
Positive Actions 
Sov. Sub-investment Grade 
Negative Actions 
Sov. Investment Grade 
Negative Actions 
Sov. Sub-investment Grade 
 Estimate z-stat Estimate z-stat Estimate z-stat Estimate z-stat 
(0, 3) window 
KA-Open 1.1756 4.51*** –0.3236 –2.38** 1.7415 1.68* –0.1394 –1.98** 
Eq. Sov. 3.5429 8.74*** 3.5918 4.24*** 2.6572 6.98*** 1.9951 3.82*** 
> Sov. 0.3198 0.40 2.5128 2.43** –0.1856 –0.30 0.4973 1.00 
         
N 5,116  1,329  12,705  982  
(0, 21) window 
KA-Open –0.1402 –0.48 –0.4668 –5.47*** 1.0286 1.65* –0.1339 –1.67* 
Eq. Sov. 2.7435 8.76*** 3.0255 11.16*** 2.8735 6.32*** 1.6448 3.96*** 
> Sov. 0.1340 0.33 2.0714 3.83*** 0.4459 0.87 –0.1003 –0.23 
         
N 5,116  1,329  12,705  982  
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Table 8 
Random Effects Model of Spill-over to HIC versus NHIC Sovereigns 
In Table 8 we investigate relative spill-over to HICs versus NHICs. We run random effects logistic regression analyses where our dependent variable, Firm-action, 
takes a value of 1 if the firm experiences a rating action in the same direction as the sovereign action within (i) (0, 3) days or (ii) (0, 21) days of the sovereign action, 
and 0 otherwise. The variables we employ are as defined for Table 4. However, in place of the Wealth/Risk Factor we employ HIC, a dummy indicating higher 
income status of a sovereign. We pool positive and negative actions and given the opposite impact of stock market volatility on spill-over for positive and negative 
actions we employ the interaction of the volatility of the stock market with the direction of the sovereign action (StDev x SovPos).  
 
In Panel B we add an interaction between HIC status and positive sovereign actions (HIC x SovPos); this analysis is for confirmation purposes only since results in 
Table 5 and Panel B of Table 6 suggest that this variable will not be significant. Across all sovereigns, 20,132 firm ratings are nested in 304 sovereign actions are 
nested in 32 sovereigns.  
 
Panel A: Relative Spill-over to HICs Controlling for Firm and Sovereign Factors 
 
 All Sovereigns 
Variable Coefficient z-stat. Coefficient z-stat. 
Dependent (0, 3) (0, 21) 
Intercept –3.7634 –4.69*** –1.5987 –2.66** 
HIC –2.4075 –6.34*** –1.2503 –4.77*** 
SovPos 0.0655 0.13 0.4163 1.10 
St.Dev. 2.5528 2.50** 2.1982 2.73*** 
StDev x SovPos –2.8756 –1.78* –2.5207 –2.00** 
Return 0.7621 1.16 0.4458 0.88 
GDP Growth –0.0624 –0.08 –0.8968 –1.60 
Firm Rating 0.1730 7.85*** 0.0238 1.82* 
Eq. Sov. 3.1515 25.75*** 2.7543 29.41*** 
> Sov. 1.1094 6.08*** 1.1141 7.73*** 
Listed 0.4172 4.68*** 0.3148 4.52*** 
Financial 1.1642 13.11*** 1.0903 15.33*** 
Insurance –0.6468 –0.98 0.1607 0.45 
Utilities 0.7331 6.03*** 0.5430 5.26*** 
Days –0.2560 –2.70*** –0.2544 –3.55*** 
Sov. Rch. –0.1731 –0.74 –0.1248 –0.70 
MultiNotch 0.9555 2.18** 1.1753 3.58*** 
Obs.  20,132  20,132 
 
Panel B: Extract From Model with Interaction Term. 
 
 All Sovereigns 
Variable Coefficient z-stat. Coefficient z-stat. 
Dependent (0, 3) (0, 21) 
HIC –2.1948 –4.88*** –1.0688 –3.38*** 
SovPos 0.2609 0.49 0.5934 1.44 
HIC x SovPos –0.4620 –0.97 –0.3750 –1.07 
Obs.  20,132  20,132 
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Table 9: Firm Defaults Following Sovereign Defaults 
Panel A indicates the incidence of negative domestic firm credit rating actions, including the assignment of a default rating (shown in parentheses in Panel A), around 
sovereign defaults, for all firms rated at the time of the sovereign default. Panel B indicates the incidence of firm defaults in the wake of sovereign defaults. Panel C 
compares the incidence of firm defaults following sovereign defaults (as shown in Panel B) with the incidence of S&P firm rating actions following sovereign-rating 
actions (as shown in Table 3). The ratings dependency is measured over the shorter term given S&P jointly determine contemporaneous firm and sovereign ratings but 
default dependency is also measured over the longer term given this is not within S&P’s control.  
 
Panel A: All Firm Negative Rating Actions Before and After Sovereign Defaults (Firm defaults included in negative 
actions are shown in parentheses). 
 
 
Country Date Sovereign 
Default 
Sov. action b4 default Firms rated at 
sov. def. 
Number of negative firm-level rating actions for firms rated at 
time of sovereign default 
    (–252, –22) 
 
(–21,–1) (0, 3) (4, 21) 
 
(22, 252) 
 
Argentina 6 Nov. 2001 Downgrade to CC 
(t = –5) 
35 129 54 0 27 (5) 43 (23) 
Greece 27 Feb 2012 Downgrade to CC 
( t = –153) 
10 21 (1) 0 0 0 3 (1) 
Indonesia 29 Mar. 1999 Neg CW to Neg 
( t = –188) 
14 0 0 0 0 1 (1) 
Indonesia 17 Apr. 2000 Stable to CW Neg 
(t = –155) 
13 1 0 0 0 16 (8) 
Indonesia 22 Apr. 2002 Downgrade to CCC 
(t = –121) 
6 2 0 0 0 0 
 
Panel B: Numbers of Firm Defaults in the Days Following a Sovereign Default 
 
Country Date Sovereign 
Default 
Rated at 
Sov. Def. 
(0, 3) 
window 
(4, 21) 
window 
(22, 252) 
window 
Argentina 6 Nov 2001 35 0 5 23 
Greece 27 Feb 2012 10 0 0 1 
Indonesia 29 Mar 1999 14 0 0 1 
Indonesia 17 Apr 2000 13 0 0 8 
Indonesia 22 Apr 2002 6 0 0 0 
 
Panel C: Default Dependency Rates 
 
  Firm default rate after sovereign defaults 
 (see Panel B but note below are 
cumulative from Day 0) 
Firm rating action after sovereign-
rating action 
(see Table 3) 
Country Date Sovereign 
Default 
(0, 3) (0, 21) 
(cumulative) 
(0, 252) 
(cumulative) 
Firm-level % 
change (0,3)  
Firm-level % 
change (0, 21) 
Argentina 6 Nov 2001 0% 14% 80% 57.6% 59.0% 
Greece 27 Feb 2012 0% 0% 10% 20.6% 24.5% 
Indonesia 29 Mar 1999 0% 0% 7% 
34.8% 
 
36.5% Indonesia 17 Apr 2000 0% 0% 62% 
Indonesia 22 Apr 2002 0% 0% 0% 
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Appendix 1: Regression Analysis to Support Table 5: Korea as Base Case  
Appendix 1 supports Table 5. We run logistic regression analyses where our dependent variable, Firm-action, takes a value of 1 if the firm experiences a rating 
action in the same direction as the sovereign action within (i) (0, 3) days or (ii) (0, 21) days of the sovereign action, and 0 otherwise. The variables we employ are 
defined in Section 3.2. However, we grand mean center some variables (indicated by GMC) to ease interpretation. The intercept represents Korea. All country 
dummy variables and control variables are interacted with the positive action dummy (SovPos) and the interaction coefficients are shown to the right of the non-
interaction coefficients to allow for ready comparison. Where there are no entries in the (0,3) window this indicates that a country has no firm-level actions in that 
window.  
 
(0, 3) window) (0, 21) window 
Non-interaction 
terms Estimate 
SovPos interaction 
terms Estimate 
Non-interaction 
terms Estimate 
SovPos interaction 
terms Estimate 
Intercept –3.3154*** SovPos 0.2323 Intercept –2.3295*** SovPos –0.0933 
ARG –0.7137 SovPos x ARG 1.8688** ARG –0.749** SovPos x ARG 1.5641** 
BRA 0.4834 SovPos x BRA –0.6525 BRA 0.5124 SovPos x BRA –1.4513** 
 
 
 
 BEL 0.5743 SovPos x BEL –1.0284 
CHN –2.0814*** SovPos x CHN 1.5218 CHN –2.4513*** SovPos x CHN 1.0226 
COL –1.0046 SovPos x COL 0.0317 COL –0.2256 SovPos x COL –1.6914*** 
DEU –1.5847* SovPos x DEU –2.4648* DEU –2.8474*** SovPos x DEU 0.5036 
 
 
 
 ESP 0.4358 SovPos x ESP –2.0813** 
 
 
 
 GBR 0.3649 SovPos x GBR –1.3153 
GRC 0.8788 SovPos x GRC –0.6172 GRC 0.3377 SovPos x GRC 0.1151 
HKG 2.5226*** SovPos x HKG –2.1761* HKG 2.5460*** SovPos x HKG –1.8451** 
IDN –0.1660 SovPos x IDN –1.3319 IDN –0.6608 SovPos x IDN –1.7421** 
IND –0.8911 SovPos x IND 0.6023 IND –0.8780* SovPos x IND –0.5853 
IRL 0.9710 SovPos*IRL –3.5770*** IRL 0.3165 SovPos x IRL –0.9495 
 
 
 
 ITA 0.2999 SovPos x ITA 0.5178 
JPN –0.9613 SovPos x JPN –0.6379 JPN –0.6523 SovPos x JPN 0.8578 
MEX 0.0719 SovPos x MEX –0.0144 MEX –0.3019 SovPos x MEX –0.2551 
MYS –0.8286** SovPos x MYS 0.3024 MYS –0.8224*** SovPos x MYS 0.5646 
NLD 2.2234** SovPos x NLD –3.1170* NLD 0.8149 SovPos x NLD –0.6325 
THA –0.9651*** SovPos x THA 1.3085* THA –0.4952** SovPos x THA –0.1068 
TUR –1.0613 SovPos x TUR 1.1971 TUR –1.4349** SovPos x TUR 1.1664* 
ZAF –1.1016** SovPos x ZAF 0.6639 ZAF –1.1984** SovPos x ZAF 0.3486 
Controls    Controls   
 
Wealth/Risk 
Factor –1.3032*** SovPos x WR Factor 0.9279 
Wealth/Risk 
Factor –1.1300*** SovPos x WR Factor 0.2660 
StDev (GMC) 4.4603*** SovPos x SD (GMC)  –8.4709*** StDev (GMC) 5.6078*** SovPos x SD (GMC)  –8.3442*** 
Firm Ratg (GMC) 0.1785** SovPos x Firm R (GMC) –0.1767* Firm Ratg (GMC) 0.1196** SovPos x Firm R (GMC) –0.1865*** 
Eq. Sov. 2.5400*** SovPos x Eq. Sov.  1.0605* Eq. Sov. 2.2825*** SovPos x Eq. Sov.  0.6077 
> Sov. 0.7556** SovPos x > Sov. 1.2304** > Sov. 0.5751 SovPos x > Sov. 0.7871** 
Listed 0.4102 SovPos x Listed  –0.0659 Listed 0.2696 SovPos x Listed  0.3133 
Financial 1.1173*** SovPos x Financial  –0.1837 Financial 1.1572*** SovPos x Financial  –0.1380 
Utilities 1.0788** SovPos x Utilities –0.4597 Utilities 0.8056*** SovPos x Utilities –0.4343 
Year Dummies Yes   Year Dummies Yes  
 
N 9,152   N 10,608  
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Appendix 2 
Country Codes 
 
Country Code 
Argentina  ARG 
Australia AUS 
Austria AUT 
Belgium BEL 
Brazil BRA 
Canada CAN 
Chile CHL 
China CHN 
Colombia COL 
Germany DEU 
Denmark DNK 
Spain ESP 
France FRA 
UK GBR 
Greece GRC 
Hong Kong HKG 
Indonesia IDN 
India IND 
Ireland IRL 
Italy ITA 
Japan JPN 
Korea KOR 
Mexico MEX 
Malaysia MYS 
Netherlands NLD 
N. Zealand NZL 
Portugal PRT 
Sweden SWE 
Thailand THA 
Turkey TUR 
USA USA 
South Africa ZAF 
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Highlights 
"New Evidence on Sovereign to Corporate Credit Rating Spill-overs” 
 
 A granular approach provides new information on the timing & extent of spill-over. 
 Domestic firm-level rating actions substantially increase after sovereign actions. 
 Spill-over is higher for NHICs but varies within both HICs and NHICs. 
 Firm & sovereign characteristics largely explain negative-positive spill-over bias. 
 Persistent negative spill-over bias exists for a sub-set of countries. 
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